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THE FREEDOM NOT TO CONTRACT
WENDELL H. HOLMES*
The A nglo-American legal tradition has long espoused the
view that contracts are creations of the exercise of mutual as
sent. General rules of offer and acceptance require that the par
ties clearly manifest their intent to be bound. This manifesta
tion ordinarily takes the form of prom ises, either express or
implied, by each party to the other. This truism is subject to an
important, although not necessarily inevitable,

qualification:

that the parties will be required to act in accordance with the
m anifestation s of their intent measured by an objective stan
dard.1 In the terminology of traditional contract law,2 it is the

•

Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. B.A. 1974, Millsaps Col

lege; J.D. 1977, Tulane University.

1.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONTRACTS §§ 2, 4, 17-24, 26, 35 (1979). This

discussion presupposes the existence of what has traditionally been called a bilateral
contract, in which both parties exchange promises. The necessary manifestation of intent
can, of course, take the form of performance in a unilateral contract. Id. § 18. The Sec
ond Restatement abandons the bilateral-uni lateral dichotomy in nomenclature.

2.

For purposes of this article, the definitions of "classical contract law," "neoclas

sical contract law" and "traditional contract law" are those suggested by Profesor Ian
Macneil. By classical contract law Macneil refers to the theoretical structure associated
with Samuel Williston. This structure is best expressed in Professor Williston's multi
volume treatise and the Restatement of Contracts (1932), for which he served as re
porter. Neoclassical contract law describes the significant modifications of that structure
represented by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second)

of Contracts (1979). I would add as an essential precursor to both the treatise of Arthur

Corbin, whose work heavily influenced both the U.C.C. and Second Restatement. Mac
neil has used the term traditional contract law to encompass both classical and neoclassi
cal doctrine. See Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations

Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 855
n.2 (1978).
This article uses the term traditional contract law because neither classical nor neo
classical theory differs significantly in its treatment of the issues discussed herein. How
ever, the following "traits" of classical contract theory should be noted:

1) an emphasis on contractual liberty manifested in a noninterventionist gov
ernmental posture a n d premised on the equality of bargaining power necessary
to make this freedom meaningful; 2) a tendency toward relativism and subjec
tivism displaying itself in a general lack of concern with good faith, fair deal
ing, and substantive justice; 3) a formalism expressing itself in a system of
autonomous, abstract, precise, general, and mechanical rules; and 4) a wide
social sweep, created by its tendency to take over areas of life now governed by
other legal doctrines. Permeating all these traits was classical contract law's
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�

reasonable person's interpretation of the promisor's int nt that
.
is of paramount significance, rather than the pr m1sor s unex
pressed, subjective beliefs.3 So long

?

as

the p� om1� ee both hon

estly and reasonably believes that the prom1sor intends to be
bound, the law deems the requisite assent to be present.•

�

From this fundamental proposition, traditional contract la

proceeded to a corollary principle: regardless of the form of h�s
.
promise, so long as a party manifests with sufficient clarity his
.
intention not to be bound, then no legally enforceable obliga
tions can result.& Thus, what in every other sense would be con
sidered a binding contract could, by use of appropriate language,
be transformed into a "gentlemen's agreetnent" evidencing a
moral obligation, "enforceable" only by the sanction o f honor
rather than the processes of law.6 According to traditional con
tract theory, then, the freedom of contract carried with it a cor 
relative freedom not to contract. The logic would seem irrefuta
ble: if all contracts are promises,7 then those promises that

main defining feature: its emphasis on freedom.
Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theor y
of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 501 (1983).
3.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) & comment c ( 1979) (defining

promise as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way,
so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made").
A classic formulation of the objective theory was given by Judge Learned Hand in
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911):
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individ
ual, intent of the parties. . . . If . . . it were proved by twenty bishops that
either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the usual
meaning which the law imposes on them, he would still be held, unless there
were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.
4.

The promisee, then, must not only be justified in an objective sense in believing

that the promisor made an offer; he must also honestly (i.e., subjectively) believe that
this was the promisor's intent. If either element is lacking, no enforceable offer has been
.
made. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954).
5. This is true both in the United States and in England. See, e.g .. W. ANSON, AN
SON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 66-67 (A. Guest 25th ed. 1979); CHESHIRE & F1FoOT's LAW OF
CONTRACT 102-04 (M. Furmston 10th ed. 1981); 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 34
(1963); J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 20, at 31 (2d rev. ed. 1974); 1 S. WILLISTON,

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1957).
6. A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 34.
7: See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) ( defining contract as "a
.
promise or a set �f promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
_
performance of which the law m
some way recognize s as a duty"). In this sense contracts
may be categori �ed as a subs �t of all promises, i.e., those promises
that are legally en
.
forceable. See Lightsey, A Critique
of the Promise Model of Contract, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 45 (1984).
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create contracts can be negated by express declarations that
they do not bind the promisor.
The "promise model"8 embraced by traditional contract law
has had no shortage of critics.9 It is hardly revolutionary to sug
gest that no unitary law of contract now exists, if indeed it ever
did. There is, h owever, no consensus regarding what has supple
mented, or perhaps supplanted, the regime of consent. The most
notable and obvious theory is that detrimental reliance may ob
tain independent standing with intent in the pantheon o f con
tractual obligations.10 Others have argued that the results of
modern contract cases may be more accurately described in
terms of the status of the parties than the requirements of the
promise model.11 A strong trend in alternative contract theory
views the relationships between contracting parties as generating
their respective rights and obligations.12 Nonetheless, arguably

8.

This article uses the term "promise model" to describe the theoretical construct

esta blished by the two Restatements for the enforcement of contracts. This construct
centers upon the traditional rules governing offer, acceptance, and consideration.

9.

By the same token, it is not without its defenders, at least in the sense of those

who view promise as the primary component of contract. The outstanding example is
Professor Charles Fried, whose recent book argues that contracts are enforceable because
promises are morally binding on those who make them. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE

(1981); see also Blum & Wellman, Participation, Assent and Liberty in Contract For
mation, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901 (arguing that freedom of contract is a liberty protected by

state and federal constitutions and that mutual assent is the fundamental standard of
contract obligation); Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980) (arguing that substantial congruence exists between

traditional contract rules and optional promissory enforcement).
10. I make no attempt to enumerate exhaustively those who have either suggested
or espoused the theory that reliance is at least an alternative to promissory obligation;
for a recent comprehensive survey of this position, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 2.
The Second Restatement, while grounded in the promise theory, is replete with refer
ences to the reliance concept. The most obvious of these is section 90 (promissory estop
pel); other provisions dealing with reliance include sections 34, 87, 89, 139, 349 and 377.
For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement:
The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 CoLU M. L. REV. 52 (1981). See also Fuller

& Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1937) (a
seminal work widely credited with bringing the question of reliance-based injuries to the
forefront of the modern law of contract damages, thereby focusing attention on the gen
eral issue of detrimental reliance).

11. See, e.g., Childres & Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1
(1972); cf. Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 575
(1943) (discussing the prominence of nonpromissory or "compulsory" obligations in mod
ern society); Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941

(1971) (arguing that modern law relates to persons primarily in the context of their social

role s).

12.

Professor Fried characterizes this theory as follows:
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the most influential contemporary authority, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, accepts the promise model and reaffirms
the freedom not to contract, albeit somewhat diffiden tly:
"Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally
binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a mani
festation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal rela
tions

may

prevent the formation of a contract."13

On this view, contractual relations establish ties of community between the
parties, and such ties generate their own moral imperatives, quite apart from
the limited obligations the parties may have assumed in creating the relation.
. . . [T)his view does not hold that a set of obligations is imposed on the par
ties by society for general social purposes; but rather, the relationship itself is
seen as implying moral duties and constraints.
supra note 9, at 76. He includes Professors Macneil, Fuller, Gilmore, Kessler,
FRIED.
C.
and Atiyah as prominent advocates of this view. Id. Significant works by those authors
include P AT1vAH. P ROMIS E S , MORALS AND LAW (1981) [hereinafter cited as P. ATIYAH,
PROMISES]; P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) [hereinafter
cited as P. ATIYAH, R1s E AND FALL); L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968); G. GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); I. MACNEIL, THE NEw SocIAL CONTRACT (1980) [herein
after cite d as I. MACNEIL, Soc1AL CONTRACT); Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bar

gaininp in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L.

R Ev . 401 (1964); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Macneil, Many Futures); cf. S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 32a, at
89-90 ( di scussi ng relational duties existing at common law).
t:t RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1979) (emphasis added). The comments elabora te on this proposition:
Parties t o what would otherwise be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree
that their legal relations are not to be affected. In the absence of any invali
dating cause, such a term is respected by the law like any other term, but such
an agreement may present difficult questions of interpretation: it may mean
that no bargain has been reached, or that a particular manifestation of inten
tion is not a promise; it may reserve a power to revoke or terminate a promise
under certain circumstances but not others. In a written document prepared b y
one party it may raise a question of misrepresentation o r mistake or overreach
ing; to avoid such questions it may be read against the party who prepared it.
The parties to such an agreement may intend to deny legal effect to their
subsequent acts. But where a bargain has been fully or partly performed on
one side, a failure to perform on the other side may result in unjust enrich
ment, and the term may then be unenforceable as a provision for a penalty or
forfeiture .... In other cases the term may be unenforceable as against public
policy because it unreasonably limits recourse to the courts or as unconsciona
bly limiting the remedies for breach of contract.
Id. comment b (emphasis added).
Section 21 was incorporated unchanged (although renumbered) from the original
d ra f t of the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 18
.
(Tent. Draft No. l. April 13, 1964). It had no direct counterpart in the First Restate
ment, perhap!I an indication that to Professor Williston, the reporter, the concept that
one ill free to nel{al � contractual obligations by appropriate expressions was so self-evi
dent that rf'�talml{ 1t wa!I superfluous. Cer tainly Williston, the paragon contracts cl ass1
. b"l
1 ity: "It is indeed true that if the
ci!lt, h<>ld no d011 I1ti; R!I to .•ts via
parties to an agree·-
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This article seeks to consider the continued viability of this
freedom not to contract14 through examination of the most com
mon situations where "no-binding-effect" clauses are utilized:
employer-employee agreements involving bonuses, pensions, and
11
death benefits, 1 and the "letters of intent" or "memoranda of
understanding" frequently executed in commercial settings. 1 8 An
analysis of these cases suggests that, contrary to traditional
dogma, such clauses are not regularly enforced by courts on any
systematic basis. The article examines the means by which
courts avoid

giving

effect

to

such

clauses, and

their

rea

sons-either apparent or real-for so doing. The discussion at
tempts to determine why parties continue to include such
clauses in their agreements, and whether any useful purpose is

ment undertake that no legal obligation shall be created, their undertaking in this regard
will be respected by the law, as would any other term of their agreement, provided
neither the agreement nor the stipulation itself is illegal." S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, §
21 , at 39-41. This article will examine the extent of the law's "respect" for such under
takings, as well as consider how strenuously courts seek the "invalidating causes" re
ferred to in comment b above.
The First Restatement did address the issue of statements of intention that do not
constitute offers, but in a far broader context than that of section 21 of the Second
Restatement. The language of the First Restatement makes an interesting comparison to
section 21:
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from the circumstances
existing at the time, the person to whom the promise or manifestation is ad
dressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend
it as an expression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further expression
of assent, he has not made an offer.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1932); see also id. § 20 (neither mental assent to
promises nor real or apparent intent to be bound is essential). The circumstances that
may create actual or constructive knowledge of the promisor's intent not to be bound are
myriad. This article is limited to those situations where an express declaration of pur
pose has been made. For distinctions of other types of cases, see infra note 17.
14. In addition to the Second Restatement, two recent and widely-used contracts
treatises, those of Professor Farnsworth and Professors Calamari and Perillo, accept this
principle with little or no qualification. According to Farnsworth, under the objective
theory, a court will honor a party's intention that his promise have no legal consequences
if the other party knows or has reason to know it. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.7, at
116 (1982). Thus, he concludes:
The easiest way for a party to make clear his intention not to be legally bound
is to say so. In a number of commercial contexts, parties enter into "gentle

·

men's agreements" that state that they are not legally binding, and it is be
yond question that the parties can in this way tum an otherwise enforceable
agreement into an unenforceable one.

Id. at 117. Professors Calamari and Perillo are essentially in accord. See J. CALAMARI &
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6-11, at 216 (2d ed. 1977).
15. See infra notes 18-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 79-129 and accompanying text.

[Vol. 60
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served by doing so. Since my conclusion suggests that there h�s
been a deterioration of the promise model of contracts, the arti
cle will consider whether the outcome of these cases may be
more accurately explained by alternative theories of contractual
obligation. The conclusion reformulates the current status of the
freedom not to contract.11

17.

It shnuld be noted that this article does not purport to be an exhaustive survey

of cases on point, and attempts no quantificational analysis. The basic methodology em
ployed is examination of representative cases within each cate ory

�nd

cases dealing in some fashion with no-binding-effect clauses which,

�

m

of s�bsequent

many mstances,
cite one or more of the principal cases as authority. For other collections of some of the
categories of cases discussed herein, see Note, Contractual Aspects of Pension Pl an
M11dificati11n, 56 CoLuM. L. REV. 251 (1956); Note, Legal Problems of Private ension
Plans, 70 HARV. L. REV. 490 (1957); Note, Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a
Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1955); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3D 464 (1972);
Annot., 42 A.L.R.2D 461 (1955).

P_

Certain other issues, related to but outside the purview of this article, should be
noted at this po i nt. First, this article is not concerned with the enforceability of so-called
"

agreem ents to agree," i.e., an agreement which the parties intend to express an existing

obligation hut which leaves one or more terms to be resolved by future negotiation.

These agreements will often be treated as unenforceable on grounds that a court should
not co nt ract for the parties or bind them to terms· upon which they were unable to agree.

SeP, e.N .. Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky.

1964) (renewal option in lease providing

for ren tal to be agreed upon on the basis of "comparative business conditions" of the two

Contra Greene v. Leeper, 193 Tenn. 153, 245 S.W.2d 181
to be agreed upon according to "business
renewal valid and enforceable; rental value subject to proof by

lease period s held invalid).

(1%1) ( re newal option in lease leaving rental
('(lnditions" at the time of

expert telltimony). Courts that refuse to enforce such agreements essentially treat the
failure to al{ree upon the terms left open

as

evidence of a lack of present assent. J. MUR

RAY �upra note 5, § 27. The Uniform Commercial Code has significantly alleviated such
• .

prohlemll in c nn tracts for the sale o f goods. See, e.g., U .C. C . § 2-204(3) (1978); J. WHITE

& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK Of THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-1 to
:1.9 ( 1972). The Second Restatement applies many of the U.C.C. concepts in this area to
rnntractll g ener a lly . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 33-34 (1979). See gen

t>rally Knapp, f:nforcinN the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1973).
A Mecond category of cases outside of the parameters of this article is the "formal
contract contemplated" cases. Typically these cases involve parties who negotiate a
transacti o n with the expectation that they will ultimately sign a formal document setting

fort h the llpecitic terms of thei r agreement. During the process of negotiation, they may
real'h an oral or written consensus on most, if not all, of the material terms of exchange.
In m ost le!(al systems, the parties can stipulate by appropriate language that the contem
plated writing is constitutive, and that there will be no contract if this writing is not
roncluded. See l R. ScHLESSJNGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON

<'oRF. or LE<;AL SvsTEMS 178 (1968). If, however, the parties are unable to agree on a
formal document and one party sues for breach, a court may be faced with the difficult
factual ques tion of whether the

�

t efore

�arties intended

their promises to be legally enforceable

.
.:� �nal
docu m�nt wa s s1g ne� . See, e.g., Sommer v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 376 F.

Supp. _9, !S.D.N.Y. 1914). As one might suspect, there is little consistency in the results

(�f

such cases. See A. CORBIN, supra note 5, §

SIMPSON, HANDBOOK

01'

30; J. MURRAY, supra note 5, § 21; L.

THE LAW OF CONTRAC TS§ 17 (2d ed. 1965); S. WILLISTON, supra

FREEDOM NOT TO CONTRACT
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EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE AGREEMENTS
Death, Pension and Other Benefits

The

most common cases dealing with no-binding-effect

clauses in employment relations i nvolve promises by employers
to pay death benefits, pensions, severance allowances, and simi
lar benefits. Such inducements indisputably enhance employee
performance, loyalty, and goodwill. For obvious reasons, how
ever, employers have long persisted (in the absence of a re
straining statute) 18 in describing these benefits as gratuitous, in-

note 5, § 28; Knapp,

supra.

Clearly, the factual permutations of such cases are limitless; this article includes
only those unusual cases where the parties have reduced their agreement to a relatively
complete written form but included a no-binding-effect clause foreshadowing the execu
tion of a further d ocument. In this instance, Corbin states that notwithstanding the
agreement on all details, the parties may still maintain "complete immunity" from obli
gation, according to their stated intentions. A. CORBIN

,

supra note 5, § 30, at 98. This

article will explore the validity of Professor Corbin's assertion.
Perhaps the most common means of denying present effect to an agreement is the
incorporation of express conditions to enforceability. While enforceability may be made
conditional on the occurrence of an extrinsic event, in commercial transactions a more
common requirement is that one party fulfill objective criteria to the other party's satis
faction. Such conditions may give rise to various factual issues, including questions of
good faith, but ordinarily they do not suggest a lack of intent to contract. Thus, many
agreements that might include expressions of present unenforceability are excluded from
the scope of this article because they link enforceability to the existence of express con

A

See
Modern View of the Mortgage Lender's Remedy,
& Kilgore, Enforcement of the Real Estate Loan
Commitment: Improvement of the Borrower's Remedies, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1011, 1015-

ditions.

common, industry-wide example in this country is loan commitments.

Draper, The Broken Commitment: A
59 CORNELL L. REV. 418 (1974); Mehr
19 (1978).

Finally, in many cases in which the parties appear to have entered into a binding
written contract, one party may challenge the contract on the grounds that both under
stood that the transaction was a sham. Such cases ordinarily turn on the applicability of
the parol evidence rule to evidence supporting that contention, rather than questions of
intent.

See, e. g., Kilpatrick Bros. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 464 F.2d 1080
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 808 (1947);

(10th Cir. 1972); Kind v. Clark, 161 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),

Arizona Cotton Ginning Co. v. Nichols, 9 Ariz. App. 493, 454 P.2d 163 (1969); McGuire v.
Luckenbach, 131 Colo. 333, 281 P.2d 997 (1955); Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 48
N.W.2d 172 (1951);

cf. Smith v. MacDonald, 37 Cal. App. 503, 174 P. 80 (1918) (provi

sion in promissory note that it would be void in the event of transfer or institution of
legal collection efforts constituted covenant not to sue).
18.

Chief among these, in the area of pensions,

come Security Act of 1974

(ERISA),

Pub.

L.

is

the Employment Retirement In

93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1001-1461 (1982)). In addition, several states have adopted statutes prohibiting em
ployers from terminating pension benefits once the plan requirements for vesting have

E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:8-4 (West Supp. 1984). Initially, American courts
all private pension plans as gratuities that could be withdrawn at any time,

been met.
regarded

even in the absence of no-binding-effect clauses. The broadest implications of the "gra-

[Vol. 60
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tended to create no contract rights, or subject to amendment or
revocation at any time. Notwithstanding such qualifying lan
guage, to the extent that an employee performs services after
such promises, one would suspect that few, if any, cases would so
severely test the reach of the objective theory. Yet one recent
treatise states that "[g]enerally, the courts have held that reli
ance on the terms of the offer creates no liability."19 Certainly,
employers have been successful in a surprising number of deci
sions. An analysis of four well-known cases and their progeny
demonstrates, however, that the assertion that employers can
generally insulate themselves from liability by the recitation of
disclaimers is highly questionable. Indeed, each of the four,
Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co.,20 Schofield v. Zion's Mercantile Insti
tution,21 Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden,22 and Psutka v. Michi
gan Alkali Co.,23 decided at the height of traditional contract

theory,2" held employers liable on promises that were, by any
objective analysis, clearly illusory and that unequivocably indi
cated an "intent" not to be bound.
Tilbert presents the archetypal case. In 1923, the defendant

issued to its employee a "Certificate of Benefit" providing for

tuity theory" have been generally discredited, although various grounds for enforcing
benefit agreements have been asserted, such as promissory estoppel, unilateral contra ct,
and deferred wages. See B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS or EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 4-14 (1961); Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired

Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 916-21 (1970); Note, A Reappraisal of the Private Pen

.,wn Sys.tern,

Reappratsal].
19.

57 CORNELL L. R EV . 278, 282-85 (1972) [hereinafter

J:. CALAMARI

& J. PERl LLO, supra note 14,

§ 6-11,

cited as Note,

at 216. The authors acknowl

.
(b]y the prcx:ess of interpretation
of the terms of the offer so as to preclude
.
withdrawal or mod1ficat10n after the employee has retired or died, such promises have
.
heen
enforced." Id. (emphasis added). This article suggests that those occa
.
s11ms have arisen a good deal more frequently than this text would suggest.

�

e ge that

on <>cca.�wn

20.

116 Conn . 357, 165 A. 205 (1933).

21.

85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934).

22.

129 Ohio S t.
.

an�e-Etfec�

� 75, 195 N.E. 697 (1935), noted in Contracts-Offer and Accept
of D1sc�aimer of Obligation in Promise to Employee 49 Harv. L. Rev. 148

(19.15) [hereinafter cited as Contracts].
23. 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 385 (193S).
24. It also should be noted that these cases arose m
. the d epths of the Great De.
.
press10n, a time when one should not be over1Y surprise
d to find emPl oyers seek"mg to
·
.
.
.
.
rene"e
given employees m thes� cases may be consiste
" on promises· The protec t 10n
nt
with other efforts, both legislative and judicial t0 protect the rights
of the disadvantaged
.
i l exigen
durina
·
cy. See e g Hom e Bid g. & L oan ss 'n
,. that period of financ·a
v. Blaisdell,
A
. ' ·. ·•
290 U.S :l9 8 (1934) (upholdi" ng cons t"1tut1onahty of M"mneso ta'
s mortgage foreclosur e
moratorium law).
·

'

·
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the payment

of

a death benefit

to the employee's

named

beneficiary. No consideration was recited. The certificate pro
vided for automatic lapse upon the employee's termination, but
more importa ntly included the following disclaimers:
"This benefit plan being voluntary on the part of Eagle
Lock Co., it i s understood that it constitutes no contract with
any Employee or any beneficiary, and confers no legal rights on
him o r them. It in no way interferes with his freedom to leave
our employ w henever he pleases, nor on the other hand, does it
take away our right

as

Employer to dismiss any Employee."

"We fully expect and hope this benefit plan as outlined
above will continue indefinitely and will be appreciated by the
Employees to the extent that we feel justified in continuing the
plan indefinitely. We must, however, and do reserve to our
selves the right to discontinue these benefits at any time with
out any liability on our part to any employee or any benefi
ciary, either or both."211

Thereafter the defendant decided to cancel the certificates
effective August 28, 1931 (the next p ayday). This fact was not
communicated to employees until their paychecks were distrib
uted that day with a notice of cancellation attached . Unfortu
nately for the defendant, the plaintiff's husband had died at 2:00
a.m. on the 28th, several hours before the working day began.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut had no diffi
culty in imposing liability on the defendant. Primarily, the court
focused upon an ostensible issue of consideration. Declaring that
the defendant "must be assumed" to have requested the em
ployee's continued service, the court found a clear acceptance of
the death benefit offer in the employee's seven years o f service
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate. By so doing, he
"forebore his right to terminate the employment and engage
elsewhere,
sought. "26

and

conferred the benefit which the

defendant

On the crucial question of intent, the court disposed of the
issue by artful interpretation. In its view, the language quoted

25.

1 1 6 Conn. a t 360-61, 165 A. at 207 (quoting "Certificate of Benefit," schedule

B). The court mentioned but did not discuss the fact that the employer had discontinued
an existing group life insurance policy concurrently with issuing the cer tificates. Id. at
359, 165 A. at 206.
26.

Id. at 362, 165 A. at 207.
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above involved only the determination whether �ither p a� ty was
obligated to continue the employment relationship. c ertamly no
.
such obligation existed. To argue, h��ever, t at this language

�

meant that the defendant had no liability despite acceptance by
the employee prior to the exercise of the res�rved �ower of revo
.
cation, "would ascribe to the defendant an mtention to � mslead
its employees, to its advantage, by an inducement which

�as

known and intended by it to be entirely nugatory, and which
this record does not require [the court] to attribute to it."27
Thus, the certificate constituted more than an expression of pre
sent gratuitous intent-it was, instead, a contract.28
Interestingly, the court did not rely upon vesting, estoppel,
restitution, contract implied-in-fact, or related concepts in arriv
ing at this result. Instead its conclusion was based on wholly un
satisfactory reasoning. Even contemporary commentators recog
nized

that, under the classical

analysis, consideration is a

significant issue only if there is a promise designed to induce a
reciprocal promise or action. Assuming the fact of promise, it
takes but little effort for a court to find a reciprocal a ction.29
The promise is the fundamental prerequisite, and it exists only

27.

Id. at 362, 165 A. at 207-08.

28.

Somewhat paradoxically, the court concluded that Eagle Lock could discon

tinue the benefits of their other employees. This is inconsistent with its statement that
the "consideration" f o r the contract was the decedent's continued employment after re
<·eiving the certificate. If the defendant were bargaining for an employee's agreement to
continue his services, then presumably the "contract" became enforceable at the point
that the employee manifested assent; thus, any subsequent attempt t o revoke the offer
would he ineffective under standard contract principles. If the defendant's offer was con
�trued as seeking service until death as acceptance (i.e., an offer for a unilateral con
tract), the acceptance would have been effective i mmediately upon the employee's death.
In that instance, however, the offer would be revocable for those who had not "ac
cepted." SeP

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42

& comment c (1979). The

court's dictum on the revocability of the certificates is thus more consistent with the
the.ory. that the certificates were continuing offers that could be accepted only by dying
while

m

the defendant's employ. However, this analysis poses the problems of the revo

cahility of offers for unilateral contracts once performance has begun. See id. § 4 5; RE
�TATE
as

�ENT

OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932). Nonetheless, the court's opinion can only be read

saying that had the employee survived 22 more hours, the plaintiff would have lost.

�

The court concluded t at the entire day in which a contract expires is open to comply
with 1t; thus, t.he termination did not become effective until the end of the day on Au
�ust :28, and death at any time on that day would entitle the beneficiary to recovery. 116
Conn. at :i64, 165 A. at 208.

29.

�ee Grism ore, Con.tracts-Effect

of a Stipulation Denying Legal Effect in an

Employers VCJ/untary Penswn, Bonus or Death Benefit Plan, 34 MICH. L.

03 ( 1936); 49

HARV.

L.

REV. 148, 149 (1935).

REV. 7 0 0 , 702-
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if the intent t o be bound is manifested on an objective basis.
The court in

Tilbert

ignored this requirement and simply inter

preted the defendant's intent to be what the court deemed it
should have been. 30
The other cases in this group follow similar patterns with
identical results, although for purportedly different reasons.

Schofield

involved claims for pension benefits under a n oncon

tributory plan. The plaintiffs had performed under this "gratui
tous" plan and had received retirement payments for several
years31 before the company revised the plaintiffs' allowances and
reduced their benefits. The operative language was recited in the
company's explanatory brochure:
"15. Neither the action of the Board of Directors in estab
lishing a System of Pensions, nor any other action now or here
after taken by them or the Board of Pensions in the inaugura
tion and operation of a pension department shall be construed
as giving to any officer or employee of the institution a right to
be retained in its service, or any right or claim to any pension
allowance; and the Institution expressly reserves its right and
privilege to discharge at any time any officer or employee when
the interest of the Institution in its judgment may so require,
without liability for any claim for pension or other allowance
than wages due and upaid."
"16. The Board of Directors reserves the right to change or
amend any of the foregoing rules and regulations at any time,
and to change the basis of pension allowances by increasing or
reducing the same, whenever, in its judgment, the welfare of
the Institution may require such change; and the decision of
said Board of Directors, in establishing such new basis shall be
absolutely conclusive."Sll

Focusing upon the substantive provisions of the pension
plan, the Supreme Court of Utah found them to encompass all
elements of valid offer-not one inviting a verbal acceptance,

30. In Professor Atiyah's words, the court indulged in the time-honored device of
surmising that "the parties 'could hardly have intended' that they should not be bound
once such-and-such has been done." P. ATIYA H Riss AND FALL, supra note 12, at 758.
,

31. It is noteworthy that the payments apparently came from the company's pay
roll account. No pension trust or annuity arrangement existed. 85 Utah at 285, 39 P.2d
at 346. This factor distinguishes certain earlier cases in which employees were unsuccess
ful. See infra note 3 5 .
32. 85 Utah at 284, 39 P.2d at 343 (quoting resolution establishing pension system).
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e that act (twenty years of
but one seeking a completed act. Onc
) had been performed,
service and attainment of age sixty-five
not be modified at the
the "contract" was completed and could
teral contract had
will of the company.ss In essence, t hen, a unila
been formed.
the em
The court construed the quoted language t o give
gen
the
Citing
ployer discretion only towar d present employees.
eral principles of construction that attempt to enforc e the pur
pose of the agreement and favor interpretations that yield valid
contracts,34 the court determined that the no-bind ing-effect
clause was inapplicable to a retired employee whose pension
rights were "fixed and determined."311

Mabley, the third case in the sequence, involved the claim

of the named beneficiary of Anna Work, a deceased employee of
Mahley and Carew Company, for payments under a death bene
fit certificate. That certificate contained the following language:
"The issue and delivery of this certificate is understood to be
purely voluntary and gratuitous on the part of this Company
and is accepted with the express understanding that it carries
no legal obligation whatsoever or assurance or promise of fu
ture employment, and may be withdrawn or discontinued at
any time by this Company."s e

In affirming a judgment for the beneficiary, the Supreme
Court of Ohio sidestepped the question of intent. Rather, the
"one question" was "the consideration for the issuance of this
certificate. "31 Since payment would not be made unless the

33.

Id. at 287-88, 39 P.2d at 344-45.
Id. at 288, 39 P.2d at 345.
35. Id � t 293, 3 P .2d at 347. The court implicitly employed a vesting
theory as
well u trad1t1on1l notions of unilateral contracts .
l n reaching thia reaolution, the court was forced to distinguish
a number of other
.
_
deciawna
whe � e. for vari�ua reaaons, employees had fared less well. In
general those cases
fall into two hnn. each inte�eating because the themes involved
are common where em
_
ployee• have failed.
In one hne, the �mployees failed to satisfy stated eligibilit
y require
�enta. In the other, the e��loyeea' rights were limited
to claims against employer-estab
hah� ��110n funda admm1atered by third parties. The employe
es' status as third-party
benetic11nes apparently prejudi�ed their claims; the failure
or discontinuance of the fund
.
created no cause of a�t10� against the employer. The lack
of emplo yer control of the
fund appeared determinative. Id. at 289, 39 P.2d at 345-46.
Similar cases are d"iscusse d
in{ra notes 58-59.
34.

..

36.
37.

�

129 Ohio St. at 377-78, 195 N.E. at 698 (quoting death
benefit certificate).
Id. at 378, 195 N.E. at 698.
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decedent died while in the company's employ, the court rea
soned that the certificate was an inducement to the employee to
continue working.38 Thus, although Anna Work had n o enforcea
ble right during her life, by working until her death she created
a binding obligation in favor of her beneficiary.
The court needed no heroic feats of interpretation to elimi
nate the n o-binding-effect clause. It stated instead only that the
language "was a part of the contract so far as Anna Work was
concerned. She had no right that she could possibly assert, as
she had to die before the right would ripen in any one. "39 The
court apparently viewed the clause as null against the benefi
ciary, however. "0 The decision concluded with the proposition
that contracts should be upheld and the rights of the parties
preserved "if the same can be done without doing violence to
language. We find no trouble in upholding this contract. "4 1
Psutka,

the last of the four, adds a somewhat different

gloss. The payments at issue were part of a comprehensive non
contributory " pension and death benefit plan" promulgated by
the employer that included the following rules applicable to
both types of benefits:
"24. This pension plan is a purely voluntary provision for
the benefit of employees superannuated or totally incapaci
tated after long and faithful service, and constitutes no con
tract and confers no legal rights upon any employee."
"25. Neither the creation of this plan nor any other action
at any time taken by the committee shall give to any employee
a right to be retained in the service, and all employees remain

38. Id. at 379, 195 N.E. at 698. Indeed, ignoring well-established principles of "past
consideration," the court even offered that the employer's expression of appreciation for
the "duration and faithful character" of Anna Work's services established a further
consideration.
39.

40.

Id., 195

See

N.E. at 698.

Id. at 380, 195 N.E. at 699 (neither the fact that Anna Work had no obliga

tion to continue her services, nor Mahley & Carew to employ her, "in any wise affected
the right of the beneficiary") .

41.

Id., 195

N.E. at 699. A contemporary writer criticized the court's reasoning as

"incompatible with orthodox contract theory," because the disclaimer was 80 explicit
that it negated the possibility that the certificate was an offer. The writer endorsed the
result, however, noting the probability of detrimental reliance by the employee, and cit
ing § 90 of the then recently promulgated Restatement of Contracts. The writer con
cluded that the case demonstrated "a tendency to avoid unconscionable results by the
application of more flexible principles." 49 HARV. L. REV. 148, 149 (1935).
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subj ect to discharge to the same extent as if the pension plan
had never been created."42

Unlike the courts in Tilbert, Schofield and Mabley, the Su
preme Court of Michigan felt constrained to face this problem
atic language more directly. With only a passing reference to
consideration,48 a divided court took up the question of intent.
To the majority, the plan consisted of two separate parts: the
"positive" promises to pay benefits, and the provisions of rule
24, denying legal effect to the positive promises. If rule 24 were
to negate the contractual nature of the plan, then "under the
rule that the first of the conflicting clauses in the instrument
shall be received and the latter rejected . . . rule 24 must fall.""'
Unwilling to completely eliminate the offending provision, how
ever, the court compromised by "reading the document as a
whole" and "resolving ambiguities against defendant." So
viewed, the "reasonable interpretation " was that "the q u oted
sections were intended to exclude claims of inchoate rights
under the plan, not to mulct the employees or their dependents
of accrued death benefits. "411
The dissent offered a classical analysis, giving primacy to
the written expression of intent. From this perspective, it was
clear that " [t)here was no intent upon the part of the employers
to enter into a binding legal obligation."46 The employee's con
tinuation of services "was a recognition that the plan did not
constitute a contract nor confer any legal rights upon him. "47
The result should thus have been simple:
It is a general rule that if the parties to an agreement stipulate
that their writing, which in all respects appears to be a con
tract, is not to be a contract, the courts will not enforce it; or if
the writing contains stipulations against legal effect, courts will
refuse to enforce such writings as contracts.••

42. 274 Mich . at 32�. _264 N.W. at 387 (quoting pension and death benefit plan).
. _ y opinion stated only
43. The ma1or1t
that "ample consideration" existed in the "at

traction of more competent workmen to defendant's employ, the inducement of better
and more continuous M!rvice, and the avoidance of expense of labor turnover." Id.
at 319,
264 N.W. at 386.

44.
45.
46.
4i.

320, 2S. N . W. at 386.
264 N . W . at 386 (emphasis in origina l).
Id. at 324, 264 N.W. at 388.
Id , 264 N . W . at 388.
Id. at 324, 264 N . W . at 388 (empha i added )

Id. at
Id.,

48.
e a
The di••ant
a· ng opm1on, of
.,.,...
cnul'M', fll i l!I to add rt>u an ohv10U11 factual diBCrepancy between Psutka and
the case it
.

·

·

·
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To the dissent, then, the defendant's position was correct: the
plan was merely benevolent, and the employer's largesse could
be dispensed or withheld, according to its individual determina
tion in each case.
Theoretical considerations aside, it is clear that in an era
predating Social Security benefits and statutory protections of
vested pension rights, the case-by-case approach suggested by
the dissenting justices in Psutka was unworkable. One would not
expect courts so to expose employees to the whims of their em
ployers. •9 Indeed, it would be naive to suggest that the results of
these cases were in any way unpredictable or extraordinary, ei
ther from an historical or doctrinal standpoint. 110 What is noteposits: i.e., the only writing in Psutka is not "theirs," but that of one party only, offered
without any mutual negotiation of terms.

49.

On the other hand, Professor Grismore criticized Psutka on this very basis. In

his view, decisions imposing liability on employers who promulgated voluntary plans
acted as a disincentive to their adoption at all. Since he believed that employers would
not repudiate such plans absent "compelling financial reasons," he favored reliance upon
"moral rather than legal pressure" to ensure their performance until such protections
became compulsory. Grismore, supra note 29, at 705.
50.

While these decisions may have represented questions of first impression in

their respective jurisdictions, there was significant authority to the contrary. Possibly the
best-known case preceding these was Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 2 1 7 Ala. 15 3,
115 So. 94 (1927). There, the employer delivered to the decedent a certificate of group
life insurance, accompanied by a form letter provided by the insurance company. While
the letter offered assurances to the decedent that the certificate would remain in force

"as long as you continue as an employee, without payment on your part or deduction
from your salary," it added: "We trust you will accept this certificate i n the spirit in
which it is given - a genuine expression of good will on our part for your loyal coopera
tion and service." Id. at 156, 115 So. at 96 (emphasis in original). The employer allowed
the certificate (as well as additional insurance purchased by the decedent for which de
ductions were made) to lapse. This was not discovered by the plaintiff until the dece
dent's death.
The court held for the employer. It saw the group policy as "a voluntary and gratui
tous act." Moreover, the employer's agreement to make payments on the additional in
surance through payroll deductions was but "a gratuitous agency." The court treated
this as a question of consideration. Finding nothing given by the decedent in exchange
for the promise, the court concluded that no contract existed. Id., 1 1 5 So. at 98.

Meyerson did not involve a no-binding-effect clause

as

such. The quoted language

apparently served only to bolster the court's impression that the employer was acting
gratuitously. Even considering that in 1927 promissory estoppel had not yet been ex
tended generally to business and commercial contracts, the decision is puzzling. As Pro
fessor

Grismore

noted

in

1936,

contemporary

courts

customarily

sought-and

found-consideration in the continuation of services. The element of bargain would be
inferred from the employer's words: See Grismore, supra note 29, at 702-03. Meyerson's
strict constructionism and lack of concern for obvious equities may be merely a reflection
of an era notoriously sympathetic to business interests. See also Dolge v. Dolge, 70 A.D.
51 7, 75 N.Y.S. 3 8 6 (1902) (upholding "gratuity" clauses of insurance, endowment, and
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tly de-emp asi�e the
worthy is that these decisions consisten
An exammat10n of
consensual elements of contract liabil ity.
gly reinforces this
later cases that deal with similar claims stron
perception.
A useful sampling can be drawn from Connecticut, where,

after Tilbert, a well-defined line of cases developed dealing with
employee benefits. Such promises have been treated generally as
giving rise to binding obligations, despite attempts by employers
to make their performance discretionary. Although these cases
deal with varying benefits and factual circumstances, the results
uniformly suggest the ongoing erosion of the pillar of intent.�1
Only in those cases where the employee's claim had an indepen
dent defect, such as failure to comply with stated qualifica
tions,r.1 lack of definiteness,68 or the lack of an enforceable

pension benefit accounts to deny claims of employees of dissolving partnership that
claims against the accounts were entitled to priority as wage claims).

51.

See Ellis v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 150 Conn. 501, 191 A.2d 546 ( 1963) (stock option

plan was valid contract where employees had to continue employment in order to earn
option; employer's attempt to reserve absolute discretion to determine number of shares
to which employee was entitled violated public policy against person serving as judge in
his own case); Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1958) (attempt to impose
succeuion tax on death benefits contested on grounds that decedent employee did not
own accrued benefit; tax levy upheld on grounds that plan amounted to contract that
could be extinguished by condition subsequent: the exercise of employer's power of dis
continuance, if and to the extent such power existed) . Cases from other jurisdicitons
citing Tilbert and conaiatent with it include Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1 ( 1st
Cir. 1978) (rights to noncontributory pension plan benefits vested once payments began;

right to "change, suspend or discontinue" plan inoperative to cu t off vested rights);
Novack

v.

Bilnor Corp., 26 A.D.2d 572, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1 1 7 ( 1966) (despite language that

act was "voluntary" and created no contractual obligation, board's resolution to pay bo
nus if employee remained with company constituted unilateral contract, giving rise to
deht that could be attached by judgment creditor) . See generally Pineman v. Oechslin,

494 F. Supp. 525 (D. Conn.), vacated, 637 F.2d 601 ( 1 st Cir. 1980) (summarizing Con
necticut law on vesting of pension rights).
52.

See Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 133 A.2d 894 ( 1957) (em

ployee's claim for pension denied because resignation after disclosure of malfeasance was
deemed voluntary; in dicta, however, the court stated that even where employer reserves
abeolute discretion over plan, court will interpret plan as a whole to effect general pur

po&e or securing employee loyalty and service; employer cannot defeat employees' rea
aonahle expectations of the promi&ed reward).
53. See Borden v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184, 1 50 A.2d 607 (1958),
involving claims for payment of year-end bonuses. The plaintiffs based their claims on

( 1) the company's put practice of paying bonuses; (2) a company brochure stating that
1t wu "customary. . for the company to pay bonuses, subject to the availability of earn
'"" and the discretion of the board; and (3) a reference on a pay slip to voluntary em

ploypr rontributiona for pensions vacations, holidays, insurance, and bonuses. The
court
.
de n i.d rP<'nvery, holdin11 that there wa� no offer and, thus, no contract. The total lack of
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promise,54 were employers successful in avoiding liability.
Moreover, cases relying upon Schofield, Mabley a n d

Psutka

follow similar patterns. Although courts cite various theories of
liability, such as vested rights,55 unilateral contract, 56 and reli
ance, 57 the d ecisions almost invariablyas indicate a willingness to

certainty regarding the bonus amount was more significant than the employer's language,
however. Past payments had varied greatly. Tilbert and Mabley, both cited by the court,
involved payments of a sum certain, or an amount calculable from a sum certain. Faced

with a nebulous claim based merely on the fact of prior payments, the court was disin
clined to relax its demand for definiteness or to search for the existence of a promise.
Lack of definiteness presents an inherent impediment to recovery in bonus cases. See
infra not es 74-75 and accompanying text.
54. See Corriveau v. Jenkins Bros., 144 Conn. 383, 132 A.2d 67 ( 1957) (employees'
claim for bonus based on contract implied-in-fact failed; mere fact that bon use s had
been previously paid gave rise to no present rights).
55.

See, e.g. , Siegel v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 201 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Pa.

1961) ( no nc o ntr ibutory pension was a vested right, not a gratuity; case remanded to re
solve issue of employee's alleged violatio n of plan provisions); Luli v. Sun Prod. Corp., 60
Ohio St. 2d 1 44, 398 N.E.2d 553 (1979); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 1 7 1 Ohio St.

405, 1 7 1 N .E .2 d 5 1 8 (1 960); cf. Neutfer v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers Int'l Union

of Am., 307 F.2d 67 1 , 673-76 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J., dissenting) (severance of union
member's benefits u pheld where, pursuant to contract, union had convicted him of acts
against the union; then-Judge Burger argued that benefit had become vested and i rr evo
cable despite discretionary language).
56.

See, e.g., Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91

(1 955) (severance benefits; alternative theory of promissory estoppel); Cain v. Allen Elec.
& Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956) (severance pay); Anthony v. Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. , 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 ( 1958) (severance pay);
Dangott v. ASG Indus., 558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976) (severance pay); Moore

v.

Postal Tele

graph-Cable Co., 202 S.C. 225, 24 S.E.2d 36 1 ( 1 943) (implied duty of good faith); cf. Ellis
v. Victor Elec. Prods., 85 Ohio App. 170, 88 N.E.2d 275 (1949) (employee bonus claim;
enforceable contract for bonus created where plaintiff accepted pay cut in transfer after

being assured that bonus would be "substantially more" than amount of decrease in
salary) .

57. See Weesner v. Electric Power B d . , 4 8 Tenn. App. 178, 344 S.W.2d 766 ( 1961)
(vested rights theory also discussed); see also Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138
Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (1955) (alternative grounds on retrial).
58. A well-known case distinguishing Tilbert and Psutka is Hughes v. Encyclope
dia Britannica, 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 1 1 7 N.E.2d 880 (1954). There, a class of defendant's
employees sought to enforce the defendant's promise to purchase retirement annuities.
The defe nd a n t reserved the right to " 'change, amend or discontinue the Plan should
future conditions in the judgment of the Company warrant such action;' " the plan addi
t ion al ly provided that it was " 'entirely voluntary on the part of the Company and . . .
shall not be construed as creating a contractual relationship between the Company and
an eligible employee.' " Id. at 518, 1 1 7 N.E. 2d at 881. The court denied recovery on both

unilateral contract and promissory estoppel theories. The court found n o contract be
cause the language o f the plan demonstrated that it was voluntary, and expressly denied
contractual effect. The estoppel argument was rejected on the grounds that there had
been no detrimental change in position, since the plaintiffs had already reti re d . The
court distinguished Psutka and Tilbert as decisions involving death benefits designed "to
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e boun d where nec
ignore written expressions of inten t not to
befor e �erform
essary to avoid a forfeiture of benefits promised
defim te stan
ance' if the benefits are calculable by a reasonably
that the
dard . G9 Impli cit in these results is the judicial belief

death
avoid the otherwise harsh result of depriving an employee's beneficiary of accrued
benefits." Id. at 519, 1 17 N.E.2d at 882.
had any
Other facts also influenced the court's opinion. First, the employees never
Equitable
with
contract
company's
The
payment.
for
company
the
against
rights
direct
The
Life Assurance specified that the benefits would accrue solely to the employees.
e.
Equitabl
against
only
rights
plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries with enforceable
e
wer
rights
employees'
the
where
cases
from
situation
this
The court distinguished
against the employer directly. See supra note 35; see also cases cited infra note 59. Sec
ond, all monies paid by the company to purchase annuities remained in the fund, so that
the company did not profit by discontinuing the plan. Finally, none of the plaintiffs were
receiving benefits when they sued, since each had already retired. In this context, the
"sence of reliance appears pivotal, although other courts have readily accepted contin 
employment as the requisite act of detrimental reliance.
Failure to establish reliance was also determinative in Armstrong Cork Co. v. Boone,
3o. 2d 863 (Miss. 1966), a case distinguishing Mabley. While the case was decided on
" technical basis of the statute of limitations, the court noted that the promise made
.Jfter injury to pay disability benefits lacked any element of inducement and was there
fore a gratuity, as indicated by language allowing the company to determine the amount
of payments.
Two cases citing Schofield that denied employee claims, Genevese v. Martin -Mari 
etta Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1969), and In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 49 F. Supp.
(E.D. Mo. 1943), are distinguishable since each involved the employer's discretion to
determine compliance with plan requirements rather than the exercise of no-binding
effect clauses.
Perhaps the clearest outright rejection of the reasoning of the principal cases is
found in Umshler v. Umshler, 332 Ill. App. 494, 76 N.E.2d 231 (1947). Although acknowl
edging the existence of contrary authority, the court adhered to the gratuity theory of
pensions and upheld the no-binding-effect language. Again, however, Umshler presented
a claim with entirely different equities. The case was a suit for separate maintenance
filed by the deserted spouse of the employee in an attempt to obtain payments allegedly
due her husband under the plan. Lack of direct inducement or reliance on her part may
have influenced the denial of her claim. Perhaps most significant, however, was that the
application signed by her husband recited that any allowance was " ' a gratuity which
may be discontinued at the pleasure of the company.' Id. at 498, 76 N.E.2d at 233.
This acknowledgement introduced an element of apparent mutual assent ordinari lack
ly
ing in <leath be�efit a�d pen ion c es. Cf. discussion infra note 7 1 and
accompanying
�
.
�
.
text (dealing with a s1m1la issue m a bonus case). Umshler
is commonly cited as an
�
example f the generally disavowed gratuity theory of private
?
pensions. See, e.g., Note,
Reappraisal, supra note 18, at 282 n.22.
As previously no , this article does not attemp
t an exhaustive survey of cases
on pomt. Its methodology 1s to examine certain paradigmatic cases
and to trace the de
velopment of their fundamental holdings through subsequent
cases with similar issues.
Only in thi� sense is a systematic analysis attempted. Noneth
eless, the weight of cases
_
supports this con�lusion.
Those cases that do not are generally factua
lly distinguishable,
! hough unquestionably some courts have
shown greater allegiance to the conce t of
�t
P
intent than others.
Othe r cases outside of the Tilbert-Ps utka
line should be noted. Amon g well-known
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written no-binding-effect clauses did not coincide with the ac-

cases recognizing the contractual nature of private pension plans is Hurd v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956); however, Hurd upheld the employer's right to
determine within stated guidelines the manner in which pensions would be computed.
Cases in which em ployees have been unsuccessful include Rochester Corp. v. Rochester,
450 F.2d 1 18 (4th Cir. 1971) (clause in pension agreement divesting pension in event of
competition by recipient not violative of public policy); Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d
786 (8th Cir. 1944) (applied gratuity theory of pensions and upheld employer's discretion
to determine compliance with conditions of plan in absence of fraud or bad faith); Gron
lund v. Church & Dwight Co., 514 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (employer's decision
not to pay bonus that employee admitted was d iscretionary was binding unless unreason
able, arbitrary, unfair or capricious, although employee's right to receive severance pay
upheld); Crawford v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Ill. App. 2d 388, 181 N.E.2d 369 ( 1962) (dis
abled em ployee promised pension after he sustained injury provided he not work for
another coal company; court held that because he was incapable of working there was no
consideration for promise). Clearly, then, employees (or those claiming through them)
have fared less well if (1) the issue is compliance with stated prerequisites, rather than
changes in the plan itself, or (2) the claimant is one other than the employee or his
successor in interest after death. This is not an absolute proposition in either instance,
however. See supra note 58.
It must be acknowledged that intent still occasionally reigns supreme. See, e.g.,
Boese v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3rd Cir. 1970), applying New York law.
Noting that it appeared unclear whether there was binding state court precedent, the
court nevertheless held that the employer could, by the use of "clear and unambiguous"
language, reserve and exercise the right to terminate a pension plan, even where this
deprived retired employees of earned rights. The employer had apparently explicitly dis
closed the uncertain nature of the plan to its employees; at least two of the plaintiffs
admitted at trial that they had been aware of the termination provision. The court also
found

no

countervailing public policy considerations.

Boase was strongly criticized in Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.

1978), where it was characterized as an example of the "discredited 'gratuity' theory of
pensions." Id. at 6 . Indeed, intent aside, the Hoefel court held that public policy dictated
that pension plans be construed to avoid the forfeiture of vested rights. Although Boase
seems an anachronism, it is possible that the gratuity theory still applies in New York.
See Note, Reappraisal, supra note 18, at 282 n.22.

A more recent example, Kari v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 261
N.W.2d 222 ( 1977 ) , rev'd per curiam, 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 ( 1978), involved a
claim for a " separation allowance." After working for defendant for seventeen years, the

plaintiff was granted a six month educational leave in 1972; there was n o guarantee of
employment upon his return, and when the leave expired, no position was available.
Thus, he was "separated" from the company. The plaintiff based his claim on a provision
in his employment handbook that "(a] Separation Allowance Plan has been established
for the benefit of salaried employees laid off or separated from the payroll under certain
circumstan ces." Id. at 95, 261 N.W.2d at 223. The handbook continued, however, that it
"is not intended nor is it interpreted to establish a contractual relationship with the
employe [sic]." Id., 261 N.W.2d at 223. Moreover, the last page of the handbook included
the following italicized disclaimer:
"The contents of this handbook are presented as a matter of information only.
While General Motors believes wholeheartedly in the plans, policies and proce
dures described here, they are not conditions of employment. General Motors
reserves the right to modify, revoke, suspend, terminate, or change any or all
such plans, policies, or procedures, in whole or in part, at any time, with or
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tual intent of the parties.
This discussion might suggest that employees who can es
tablish reliance on a specific promise of a benefit can presump
tively overcome a no-binding-effect clause . That this analysis is
over-simplistic is demonstrated by cases involving performance
bonuses, which pose superficially similar issues but frequently
reach opposite results.80

B.

Employee Bonuses

One of the modern authorities most frequently cited81 in
support of the freedom not to contract is Spooner v. Reserve
L ife Insurance Co.82 The plaintiffs were agents of the defendant
insurance company. The defendant issued a bulletin to staff
members entitled "Extra Earnings Agreement," reporting the
phenomenal growth of the company. I n addition to language
cheering, challenging, and exhorting its agents, the bulletin
stated that each agent "will receive" a bonus based upon his
lapse ratio.63 More important, however, was the presence of the

without notice. The language used in this handbook is not intended to create,
nor is it to be construed to constitute, a contract between General Motors and
any one or all of its employees."
Id., 261 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting employment handbook). While acknowledging that com
munications to employees may constitute an offer to contract, the court found the above
d isclaimers too explicit to constitute an offer. In addition, the court found that the man
ner of communication precluded the possibility of detrimental reliance. In the court's
words, "(i]t is difficult to imagine what defendant could have done, short of not mention
ing the plan, to prevent the reading of its statement as an offer." Id. at 98, 261 N.W.2d
at 224. Thus, summary judgment for General Motors was upheld.
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Kari indicates that the freedom not to contract is
not wholly moribund in employment cases. The plaintiff's claim, however, was somewhat
less than compelling. Not only was his initial "severance" voluntary, it was initiated at
his request. Moreover, he apparently knew that he might forfeit his job. In light of this,
the court was not disposed to find that his continuing employment after promulgation of
the plan constituted consideration for a contract; in the court's view, "further negotia
tions" were necessary. It is questionable whether the court would have reached the same
result if the plaintiff had presented a more sympathetic claim, such as an involuntary
separation. In any event, the Michigan Supreme Court ulti mately reversed the Court of
Appeal, and remanded for retrial on the issue of promissory estoppel. Kari v. General
Motors Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W .2d 925 (1978).
60. See 1upra notes 53-54.
6 1 . E.g., Kari v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 98, 261 N.W.2d 222, 224
( 1977), rl'v'd per curiam , 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 ( 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OP \.ONTRACT!l § 2 1 , reporter's note to comment b ( 1979); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra
n ote 1 4 , § 6- 1 1 , at 2 1 6 n.98.
62.

47 Was h. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 ( 1 955).

6:l.

Id. at 456, 287 P.2d at 736. Bonu11es would increase in inverse proportion to the
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following disclaimer:
"This renewal bonus is a voluntary contribution on the
part of the Company. It is agreed by you and by us that it may
be withheld, increased, decreased or discontinued, individually

or collectively, with or without notice. Further, this Renewal
Bonus is contigent upon you actually writing business for this
Company as a licensed agent at the time such Bonus is paid."84

The bulletin was to be signed by each agent and returned to the
home office.
The plaintiffs, who had maintained appropriate lapse ratios,
sued when the bonuses described in the bulletin were not paid.
Reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the above paragraph rendered the promise
illusory and unenforceable. It also refused to apply promissory
estoppel. While acknowledging that detrimental reliance may
sometimes make the gratuitous promises of employers enforcea
ble, the court could find

no

promise, gratuitous or otherwise, in

the express language of the bulletin.
The plaintiffs sought to rely upon Tilbert, Ma hley, and
Psutka to overcome the disclaimer clause.85 The court, however,
saw the death benefit cases as fundamentally different. In those
cases,
in order to avoid seemingly harsh results and to shape the end
result a little nearer to the courts' desire, plain language . . .
was

ignored

or so interpreted

as

to import

enforceable

promises. No case has been cited to us, nor have we discovered
any, in which the right to a bonus has been upheld in a situa
tion in which the employer reserved the right to withhold it.88

ratio of lapse of existing policies, according to a specific schedule.
64. Id. , 287 P.2d at 737 (quoting "Extra Earnings Agreement" bulletin ) (emphasis
in original).
65. In addition to the cases, the court mentioned Schofield as possible support for
the plaintiffs' position. Id. at 460, 287 P.2d at 739.
66. Id. , 287 P.2d at 739. This statement is puzzling in light of the immediately
preceding citation of George A. Fuller Co. v. Brown, 15 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1926), and
Wellington v. Con P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S.W. 396 (1925). In
Fuller, the plaintiff was given a written promise of a bonus upon his compliance with
certain conditions; the employer reserved the power to be the "sole judge as to what
bonus, if any, should be paid." The court held that the plaintiff relied upon a definite
promise, thus creating a contract. The court construed the language used by the defend
ant as limited to the determination of compliance with the stated conditions and the
amount of bonus.
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The crucial distinction seemed to be that the death benefit cases
brought by

were

named

third-party

bene ficiaries,

whereas

Spooner was prosecuted by the employees themselves. In the
court's view, although Reserve Life's acts were "perilously near
the perpetration of a fraud,"67 the difference in the standing of
the plaintiffs justified the court's refusal to " disregard or sup
press" the terms of the agreement.68

Spooner is, in many ways, an extraordinary case, both in
terms of the precedents the court chose not to follow and the
inherent equities it elected to ignore. To differentiate it from the
death benefit cases because of those cases' supposedly more
compelling reliance may have some superficial logic, but the dis
tinction does not withstand analysis. In another sense, the reli
ance of the claimants in Spooner is much more immediate than
that of plaintiffs in the death benefit cases. The Spooner plain
tiffs sought to enforce compensation promised them for their
own labors, while the death-benefit beneficiaries had not person
ally relied on the employers' promises, at least in any identifi
able sense. Any " detriment" incurred o r reliance manifested was
of their

that

predecessors.

Thus,

the

plaintiffs' claims

in

Spooner would seem, at least, equally forceful.
Further, the Spoo ner court gave no credence to explicit lan
guage in the "bulletin" that not only permitted, but actively en

couraged, reliance. The employees were told that the defendant
wanted them to "enjoy a sense of real security and see the road
of the future stretching clearly ahead"; to " earn more money
than

[the employees]

could anywhere

else"; to be "career

men-men who are as much concerned about next year as next

month"; to be "very handsomely rewarded" for an "outstanding

The plaintiff in Wellington based his claim on a profit-sharing plan that the
and described in detail in a personal writing to the plaintiff. The
plan was characterized as voluntary, and annually renewable. The
court held that the

defendant developed

�laintiff's performance created a unilateral contract, so that any lack of "mutuality" was
�rrelevant. �nd.erlying this result was unquestionably a healthy dose of judicial anim os
ity The plamt1ff had become a union organizer at some time after
the delivery of the
:
written greement, and the defendant's refusal to pay was
clearly punitive.

�

While the "no contract" language employed in Fuller
and Wellington is less specific
.
than that m Spooner, the Spooner court's assertion that no
similar bonus cases existed
seems unjustified, apart from its artificial reliance on the
use of the word "withhold. "

67.

47 Wash. 2d at 459, 287 P.2d at 738.

68.

Id. , 287 P.2d at 738.
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designed

as

an

inducement, and the subordinate nature of the reservation of
discretion s uggested at most that it would be used in good faith
only in extreme instances. In light of the bulletin's express invi
tation to rely upon the company's promises, the court's decision
is particularly difficult to accept.
The opinion barely alluded to the apparent factual basis of
the decision: the court's belief that the plaintiffs were aware of
the disclaiming language. Thus, the fact that the plaintiffs were
required to sign the "bulletin" and return it to the company
may

have

been

pivotal.

Even

the

language

of

the

dis

claimer-" [ i ]t is agreed by you and by us"-couched the plan as
a mutually negotiated agreement. 70 However disingenuous the
court's acceptance of this tactic may have been, it distinguishes
the death benefit and pension cases, in which the rights to alter
the employer's obligations were imposed unilaterally. Similarly,
Tilbert, Schofield, Mabley, Psutka, and their progeny lack the
element of written acceptance found in Spooner.11
As previously noted, the Spooner result was a departure
from many prior employment cases.72 Subsequent cases citing

69.

Id. at 455, 287 P.2d at 736 (emphasis in original). The defendant further stated

that by this plan, "the boys are separated from the men. The boys will get no bonus.
That Leaves More For The Men." Id. at 456, 287 P.2d at 737 (emphasis in original).
Presumably the defendant intended this to apply with equal force to its female agents,
since one of the named plaintiffs appears to have been a woman.
70. Id. at 456, 287 P.2d at 737 (emphasis in original).
71. Cf. RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 45, comment b ( 1979) (using
Spooner as an example of unjustified reliance due to language of "offer"). As previously

noted, one pension case, Umshler, involved a s imilar written acc eptanc e, and the claim
ant likewise was unsucc essful. See supra disc ussion at note 58.
Interestingly, vesting, another theory succ essful in many death benefit cases, was
raised by th e plaintiffs to no ava il. The court bri efly discussed whether the term "with
hold" in the disclaimer could refer only to future payments, but concluded that it was to

be given its ordinary meaning, "to refrain from paying that which is due." Spooner, 47
Wash. 2d at 459, 287 P.2d at 738.
72.

See G e orge A. Fuller Co. v. Brown, j l 5 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1926); W ellington v.

Con P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S.W. 396 (1925). Wellington is fre
qu ently cited as authority for the proposition that continued employment constitutes
consideration for the promise of a benefit or bonus. See Lampley v. C elebr ity Homes,
Inc., 42 Colo. App. 359, 594 P.2d 605 (1979); Nilsson v. Cherokee Candy & Tobacco Co.,
639 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see a lso Geiwitz v. Ge iwitz, 473 S.W.2d 781 (Mo.

Ct. App. 197 1 ) (hold ing that railroad pension was contract subject to garn ishment by

divorced wife). But see Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965) (employees had no cause of action for noncontributory pension where they
had no notice b e fo r e revocation that pension tr ust had been established); Croskey v.
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Spooner have often reached res�lts adver�e to employ�e int� r
ests. Yet almost without exception,73 despite language

m

op m

ions emphasizing no-binding-effect clauses, other . factors appear
to determine the outcome. Chief among these is lack of c� r

tainty, a recurring problem for plaintiffs in bonus cases.74 While
.
employers frequently promise rewards for special eff�r� s, t ey

�

often fail to quantify a specific benefit. Without exphc1t guid
.
ance on the substance of the promise, many courts have simply
denied recovery.n Other courts, however, have demonstrated a
willingness to construe contracts to render no-binding-effect
clauses inoperative, both in bonus76 and other benefit cases,77 or
to recognize the possibility of recovery based on promissory
estoppel.78

Kroger Co., 259 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953) (bonus not earned where plaintiff was
discharged for sufficient cause).
73.

See, e.g., Albertson v. Ralston Purina Co., 586 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ,

involving a claim for severance pay. The court held that a policy to pay, "in limited and
exceptional cases, a gratuity to a separated employee" constituted an illusory promise .
Id. at 777 (emphasis in original). This promise could also have failed for lack of definite
ness. See infra notes 74-75.
74.

In one of the classic cases dealing with lack of certainty, Varney

v.

Ditmars, 217

N.Y. 223, 226, 111 N.E. 822, 823 ( 1916), the court refused to enforce an employer's prom
ise to pay "a fair share of my profits" as a bonus.
75. See, e.g., Sandeman v. Sayres, 50 Wash. 2d 539, 3 1 4 P.2d 428 (1957) (no dis
claimer , but bonus provision in e m ployment contract merely stated that a "suitable in
centive . . . will be decided upon"); Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 199, 665
P.2d 4 1 4 ( 1 983) (employee fired for cause not entitled to bonus where employer retained
v. Boeing Co., 8 Wash. App. 347, 506 P.2d 329 ( 197 3)
(suggestion bonus; rules referred to amount of cssh award, "if any," as totally within the
company's discretion). The presence vel non of a disclaimer thus seems much less signifi

discretion as to amount); Calkins

cant than the unwillingness of courts to "make" a contract for the parties. It appea rs,
however, that the presence of a disclaimer may have influenced certain courts to deny

alternative claims for recovery in restitution, presumably on the basis that under the
circumstances the plaintiff was acting as a volunteer. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §
1 1 2 ( 1936); II G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.1 ( 1978).
76. See Osborn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 309 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962) (language too
uncertain to support summary judgment for employer on basis that it had reserved abso
lute discretion to appropriate a valuable idea without compensation; both quasi-contract
and contract implied-in-fact theories mentioned); Allen D. Shadron, Inc. v. Cole, 101
Ariz. 122, 416 P.2d 555 (1966) (court severed language to find alternative promises, with
discretionary language only modifying the promise to pay a bonus, not rendering it " illu 
.
sory"; thus employer promised to make a decision-"discretion" was not synonym ous
with " optional"). In each of these cases, the court ig nored obvious problems of
uncertainty.
7 7 . See Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1971) (claim for
severance p �� ; ��urt con�trued "management approval" language to apply only to verifi
cation of ehg1b1hty requireme nts).
78.

Kari

v.

General Motor s Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2
d 925 (1978), reu'g 79
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Critical analysis of these cases, then, suggests a conclusion
similar to that reached as to the pension and death benefit cases:
given a statement of commitment by an employer to pay a defi
nite or reasonably calculable monetary benefit, courts have gen
erally endeavored to find a basis to enforce the commitment.
The presence of a no-binding-effect clause, disclaimer or reser
vation of d iscretion will generally not preclude recovery, so long
as the employee has rendered the requested performance, his re
liance was reasonable, and his claim is not impaired by extrinsic
infirmities. An expression of intent not to be bound appears rel
evant

primarily

when

it

c omplements

another

basis

for

nonenforcement.
Any conclusion regarding the status of the freedom not to
contract i s premature, however , without examination of a wholly
separate category of cases. Letters of intent, which feature no
binding-effect language similar to that utilized in employer-em
ployee cases, add new considerations to the issue o f assent.
II.

LETTERS

OF

INTENT

Documents styled "letters of intent" or "memoranda of un
derstanding" are commonly encountered in business transac
tions. 79 The use of letters o f intent has long been u b iquitous in
the securities industry in negotiations for firm commitment un
derwriting. 80 They may be used, however, in almost any com
mercial negotiations, including m ergers and other corporate ac
quisitions, 81

sales

of ongoing

businesses82

and

other

asset

purchases,83 financing and loan agreements,84 real estate transac
tions,8is

personal

property

transactions,86

and

agreements

Mich. App. 93, 26 1 N.W.2d 222 (1977).
79. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 37, at 117 & n.3.
80. C. ISRAELS & G. DuFF, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 70-71 ( 1 962); Wheat &
Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAW. 539, 553-54 (1960).
81. G. McCARTHY, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 129·30 (1963); see, e.g., Itek Corp. v.
Chicago Aerial Indus., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
82. E.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F. Supp. 597
(S.D.N.Y. 1 97 1 ) ; I.H. Rubenstein & Son v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 222 So. 2d 329 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 757, 226 So. 2d 521 ( 1969).
83. E.g., Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33 (Alaska
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 ( 1984).
84. E.g. , Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. K-Way Assocs., 388 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1968).
85. E.g., Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Clark, 3 Wash. App. 1001, 478 P.2d 752
(1970).
86. E.g., F ilmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 517 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
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relating to entertainment and artistic services and products,37
among others.88 Although often couched in the form of a mutual
commitment, these "agreements" frequently include no-binding
effect clauses.89 The reasons for the use of these devices may dif
fer according to the circumstances of each transaction.
In firm commitment underwriting, the use of letters of in
tent is highly structured. The issuer contemplating a public of
fering of securities seeks an expression of assurance from the un
derwriter that it will go forward with the offering, absent some
extraordinary occurrence. Without this assurance, the issuer is
hesitant to incur the substantial expense of registering the offer
ing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. By the same
token, the underwriter is unwilling to undertake a legal obliga
tion at a time when SEC approval is still forthcoming and may
not materialize. Thus, the letter of intent constitutes primarily a
moral commitment by the underwriter that it will perfo rm if the
registration statement becomes effective. While the agreement
sets forth the general terms of the offering, the underwriter's
compensation, and possibly other terms, invariably it will specif
ically negate the existence of any legal commitment by either
party.90 This provision is, of course, chiefly for the underwriter's
benefit. Nonetheless, since there have been few instances of

(court treated contract of sale as letter of intent).
87. See Taddeo, Agreeing to Agree: The Importance of Correctly Drafting a Letter
of Intent, N.Y.L.J., April 5, 1985, at 5, col. 1 .
88. The precise usage described here i s limited to business settings. The question

of whether an "agreement" evidences a contractual obligation as opposed to a nonbind
ing statement of mere intent can, of course, arise in other contexts. See, e.g., Feick v.
Fleener, 653 F .2d 69 ( 2nd Cir. 1981), discussed infra note 99.
89. Obviously, this is not universally true. When the intent not to be bound is un

expressed, writings frequently give rise to "formal contract contemplated " cases. The
issue then becom es whether the parties intended to be bound at present, or only upon
the execution of a future , more detailed document. For a discussion of these cases, see

supra note 17 and the authorities cited therein.
90. See authorities cited supra note 80. The following is a typical no-binding- effect

clause:
This mem orand um is accepted by the Company, and by Mr. X on behalf of the
selling stockholders, as a statement of mutual intention at this time to effect
the proposed tran sactions along the lines indicated above, but it does not con
stitute any commitment on the part of the Company, the selling stockholders
or any unde rwriter except as to assumption of expenses as aforesaid. Such a
commitm ent will be undertaken only under the aforementioned underwriting
agreement if our customary form shall have been entered into among the Com
pany, the selling stockholders and the underwriters, all acting severally.
a note 80, at 309.
C. ISRAELS & G. DUFF, supr
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unjustified default by underwriters,91 these agreements provide
issuers with sufficient comfort to justify the out-of-pocket ex
penditures that precede the offering.92
In other contexts, letters of intent may be used where intra
corporate or regulatory authorization is a necessary prerequisite
to consummation of a transaction. Parties who have not yet
completed negotiations on all material terms may use a letter of
intent to memorialize the substance of their agreement at its
current stage and to provide an impetus to consummate the bar
gain. Letters of intent may also be useful where other conditions
to closing are imposed by either party.
The true letter of intent is, at least to some degree, a mutu
ally negotiated document. This would suggest that in ordinary
circumstances, the expression of intent not to contract would go
unchallenged. Inevitably, however, a party who renders perform
ance subsequent to the execution of the letter may feel aggrieved
if the other party elects to exercise his "freedom" not to pro
ceed. Such circumstances test the extent of the freedom not to
contract.
Perhaps the best-known case seeking enforcement of a let
ter of intent, Dunhill Securities Corp. v. Microthermal Applica

tions, Inc. ,93 involved securities underwriting, the industry in
which the use of such documents is probably the most widely
accepted. 94 Even more interesting is the fact that the under
writer, normally the beneficiary of the no-binding-effect clause
and its drafter in this case, brought the action. The plaintiff was
to act as principal underwriter for a proposed offering of the de
fendant's common stock. The parties entered into a letter of in
tent which provided, in pertinent part:

91.
at 553.

C. ISRAELS & G. DuFF, supra note 80, at 70; Wheat & Blackstone, supra note 80,

92. While, at least in theory, the letter of intent has only the sanction of conscience
to insure its performance, even the execution of a formal underwriting agreement does
not provide absolute assurance to the issuer. Underwriters have long incorporated "mar
ket out" provisions allowing them to withdraw from a formal underwriting agreement in
the event of sufficiently material adverse developments in the securities markets. See C.
ISRAELS & G. DuFF, supra note 80, at 78-79; Gourrich, Investment Banking Methods
Prior to and Since the Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 44, 56 (1937);
see, e.g. , Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (1948).
93. 308 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
94. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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Since this instrument consists only of an expressi?n �f our
mutual intent, it is expressly understo? d that no hab1hty or
obligation of any nature whatsoever is mte� ded to

� e crea�ed

as between any of the parties hereto. This letter is not

m

tended to constitute a binding agreement to consumm� te the

financing outlined herein, nor an agreement to enter mto an
Underwriting Agreement. . . . In the event that the Under
writing Agreement is not executed and/or the p urchase of the
securities is not consummated, [the Underwriter] shall not be
obligated for any expenses of the Company o r for any charges
or claims whatsoever arising out of this letter of intent or the
proposed financing or otherwise and, similarly, the Company
shall not be, in any way, obligated to [the Underwriter].ee

After approximately two months, during which each party took
certain actions pursuant to the letter, the company discovered
that the SEC had previously instituted three separate enforce
ment proceedings against the underwriter. It promptly wrote the
underwriter to terminate their relationship.96 The underwriter
sued to enforce the letter of intent as a binding agreement or,
alternatively, to obtain restitution for the value of its services
performed and for its out-of-pocket expenditures.
The court rejected both claims. On the contract claim, the
opinion quoted Professor Williston: " 'It is indeed true that if
the parties to an agreement undertake that no legal obligation
shall be created, their undertaking in this r egard will be
respected by the law, as would any other term of their agree
ment, provided neither the agreement nor the stipulation itself
is illegal.' "97 Since there was no ambiguity in their expressions,
the court stated that the parties could not be bound unless and
until a fo rm al underwriting agreement was executed. The deci
sion emphasized the customary usage of letters of intent in the
securities industry, making it clear that such documents are only
regarded as tentative expressions of intention.
Regardi �g the quantum meruit claim, the court simpl y
tated that smce the underwriter expressly waived compensation
�
·� t e letter of •_ �te�t, it could not claim restitutionary relief.
S1m 1larly, the plamttff's k nowledge of practices in the securities

?

9fi.

:l08 F. Supp. at 197.

96.
91.

Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 1 97 (quoting 1 S.
W1LL1STO N, supra

note 5, § 21).
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industry relating to registration of public offerings precluded
any argument that the underwriter had acted in reliance upon
the company's implied request.98
Dunhi ll is strong evidence that the freedom not to contract
is still viable.99 What remains, however, is to determine its reach.
This inquiry should begin with an analysis of Dunhill itself. It
is, notably, a brief opinion. The court perceived the operative
issue in fairly straightforward terms; the language of the deci
sion offers little suggestion of variable factors that might have
dictated a contrary result. In addition to expressed intent, two
facts appear determinative. The first is that there was little per
formance prior to the company's letter of termination. Thus, the
parties' relationship was still in a fairly executory posture. 1 00
Even more significant, however, was the industry-wide prac
tice involving letters of intent. Their wide-spread use by securi
ties professionals meant that the underwriter could not seriously
allege that it believed the letter to be a binding commitment.
Moreover, no disparity in bargaining power was evident. Given
the understanding of the nature of such documents in the finan
cial industry, the court might have reached the same result even
absent the no-binding-effect clause.1 01 In either instance, the

98.

308 F. Supp. at 198. The broader question of compensation for performance

pursuant to a letter of intent is discussed from the English perspective in Ball, Work
Carried Out in Pursuance of Letters of Intent-Contract or Restitution?,

99 L.Q. REV.

572 (1983). The author makes the point that the focus upon intent in cases involving

compensation for partial performance based on a letter of intent obscures the operative
issue of the extent of legal liability. Id. at 586. He argues that restitutionary relief is too
limited in many circumstances, and that a flexible approach is needed to protect justified
expectations; where appropriate, a hybrid restitution-contract liability should be en
forced by the i mposition of implied terms. Id. at 580, 587-90.

99.

Of course, Dunhill is not the only evidence, as the previous discussion of

Spooner illustrates. See supra notes

62-71 and accompanying text.

100. This decision supports Professor Atiyah's assertion that classical contract the
ory's requirement of intent to create legal relations "is concerned with executory agree
ments alone. " The greater the extent of reliance, the more likely a court will use various
fictions to "manufacture" the requisite intent. P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 12,
at 758.
101. A common usage denying the legal effect of certain types of agreements can
give rise to a conclusive presumption that all such agreements are unenforceable. For
example, English courts have consistently held that co,llective bargaining agreements are
not subject to legal action because of the "climate of opinion" that the parties to such do
not intend to be bound. See Ford Motor Co. v. Amalgamated Union of Eng'g & Foundry
Workers, ( 1969] 2 Q . B. 303, 331 (bargaining agreements "remain in the realm of under
takings binding in honour"). By statute, these agreements are now conclusively pre
sumed unenforceable absent specific language stating that the parties intend for them to
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court would have been justified in finding that reliance upon the
letter was unreasonable. Thus, while expressed intent is one op
erative element in the decision, it is by no means the only salient
one.
Subsequent cases citing Dunhill have not dealt with the
specific issue in that case, that is, the enforceability o f an under
writer's letter of intent. 1°2 Indeed, only one of Dunhill's p rogeny
104
deals with a true letter of intent.103 That case, Garner v. Boyd,

be legally binding. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 18. See W.
ANSON, supra note 5, at 66-67; CHESHIRE & FIFOOT's LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 5, at
104-05; Hepple, Intention to Create Legal Relations, 28 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122, 122-24
(1970).
102.
103.

In fact, no case has been found in which a similar attempt has been made.

Two cases citing Dunhill have characterized the writings a t issue a s "letters of

intent," but neither involved a true no-binding-effect clause. One case, Feick v. Fleener,

653 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1981), involved a dispute among related heirs over the existence of
an agreement to share legal fees stemming from litigation instituted by their decedent

and pursued by one group of heirs. The other group elected not to join in the litigation

and expressed their unwillingness to make a commitment to share expenses. A letter

written by a member of this group suggested, however, that if his interest in the estate
were enhanced by the litigation, he would pay his fair share of expenses. The letter ex

pressed a desire to meet and resolve mutual differences on this and other issues affecting

the estate. When the litigation proved successful, the other heirs sought to force the

writer 's group to pay its proportionate share of the legal fees.
In rejectin g the claim, the court held that the language of the letter explicitly indi
cated that the writer intended not to be bound. While the writer stated expressly that he
would share in the expenses if he were benefitted, the court saw this in the larger context

of an "offer" only to meet and negotiate towards a settlement of many differences. Thus,
as in Dunhill, there was no "promise" upon which the plaintiffs could rely. Moreover,
even if there had been, the plaintiffs could demonstrate no inducement or change in

position ; they had already bargained for the attorney's services and committed to pay
the fee before the letter was written. Id. at 79.
The other case, Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 517 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N .Y.
1981), involved what was in effect a fraudulent transfer. On February 25, 1981, the court

had ordered Filmvideo to deliver to Hastings 23 Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures.
When Filmvideo failed to comply , Hastings brought an action for contempt. At that
point, Filmvideo stated for the first time that it could not comply because it had pur
portedly sold the pictures to Vanguard Film Corporaton on December 1 4 , 1979. The
court concluded that the agreement between F ilmvideo and Vanguard was a nonbinding
letter of intent. In � upport of this, the court noted that while each had signed the docu 
ment, it lacked their corporate seals, and used the words "will assign," which showed no
present transfer. The court ordered Filmv ideo and Vanguard to surrender the films or
face a $10,000 fine. Id. at 68.

P resented with Fil rnvi�eo's postjudgment story that,
two years before litigating
rights to the fil �s, 1 � had sold them to a third party, it is hardly surprisi
roperty
p
ng that
co
deo a �d Vanguard to their predealin
the urt would return F1 lmv 1
g status. Also notewor
had been m v.angu�rd 's possession
from the outset of the origi
thy was that the pict ures
alleged cons 1derat1 on for the "sale"
nal litiga tion . (P art of the
was Vanguard's cancella
fees. Id. at 67.) .
tion of accrued storage
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serves as a n important qualification to the freedom not to
contract.
In Garner, certain principals of Standard Milling Company,
a company in financial distress, organized a second corporation,
United's A merican Milling & Manufacturing Company, for the
purpose of acquiring Standard's assets. Those assets were trans
ferred through foreclosure on April 1, 1969, b y a deed to
United's A m erican, even though United's American's corporate
charter was not issued until April 20, 1969. No stock of United's
American was ever issued and no new capital was paid into it; it
continued Standard's operation with the same assets, properties
and personnel. On April 1 5, 1 969, Standard was adjudicated a
bankrupt.
In the interim, certain individual defendants s igned a letter
of intent to exchange United's American's stock for stock in
United American Industries, Inc., a separate Arizona corpora
tion. Although this letter was subsequently rescinded, the stock
of the Arizona corporation was delivered to the defendants prior
to cancellation of the agreement.
Standard's trustee in bankruptcy instituted an action
against the individual defendants to obtain possession of the
stock of the Arizona corporation. The court found a common
scheme by the defendants to transfer the assets of the bankrupt
corporation to a new concern in order to defraud the bankrupt's
creditors. Employing conflict-of-interest principles, the court
reasoned that the defendants, as trustees of the corporation, had
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the c orporation
and that the profits they gained were therefore the corporation's
property. As successor in interest to the corporation, the trustee
was entitled to the stock. 105
In an effort to defeat the trustee's claims, the defendants
argued that the agreement with the Arizona corporation was a
nonbinding letter of intent that had been rescinded. The court
rejected this assertion, stating simply that " [t]he instrument
designated as a letter of intent of April 1 1 , 1969 i s in reality a

104.
197 1 ) .
105.

330 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.
Id. a t 26-27
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contract. " 1 06

Distinguishing

the

"true

letter

of

intent"

in

Dunhill the court found that the document included all essen
tial ter

�

s of the contract in "clear and unambiguous" lan
guage. 1 07 More significantly, however, those clear and unam bigu
ous promises had been performed, in effect, before rescission.

108

Thus, the "letter of intent" was not merely a memorial of a
"preliminary understanding. "109 It was now an e x ecuted con
tract, and the bankrupt, whose assets were the only property
traded to the Arizona corporation, was entitled to that contract's
benefits. 1 10
The court does not reproduce the language of the April 1 1
letter, and i t i s unclear whether it explicitly incorporated a no
binding-effect clause. Had it contained one, it is safe to say that
it would not have affected the outcome. Regardless of the com
mon understanding of the effect given to letters of intent, Gar

ner makes it clear that such expressions are significant only to
an essentially executory agreement. Once one side has rendered
substantial performance, parties cannot safely rely upon expres
sions of intent to effect a return to the status quo ante . 1 1 1 Thus,

the freedom not to contract must at least be qualified to this
extent: even where a writing may be understood i n ordinary us
age not to represent a legal obligation, it will acquire increas
ingly binding characteristics as performance overlaps inten

tion . 1 12 For the drafter who seeks to memorialize a tentative

106.

Id. at 25.

107.

Id. at 26.

109.
1 10.

Id. at 25 - 26.

108. Id. The nature of the individual defendants' performance is unclear. The let
ter provided for the exchange of "the absolute complete ownership of United's American
Milling & Manufacturing Co." for 1 ,733,333 shares in the Arizona corporation. Id. at 25.
Presumably this referred to a stock exchange, yet no United's American stock was ever
issued. It would appear that the Arizona corporation at least assumed control of United's
American's operations.
Id.

1 1 1 . O f course, the element of creditor protection was a powerful impetus to the
Garner court's refusal to cha�acterize :he letter as lacking
legal efficacy. However, this
does not detract from the ultimate po mt of the decision: recitals alone are not enough.
1 1 2. Similar results might also be reached by arguing that, while the letter of intent is not itself enforceable, subsequent actions of the parties may imply the existence
of promises; the letter may �hen be persuasive evidence of the content of those promises.
An inte resting compari son to Garner is I.H. Rubenstein & Son, I n c. v. Sperry &
1st Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 757,
Hutch inson Co., 222 So. 2d 329 ( La. Ct.
226 So.
.
1 1
2d 52 ( 969) , o�e of t.he few cases m whic h the no-binding-effect clause was as explicit
_
as that in Du nhtll. At issue was a letter of mtent concerning the plaintiff's purchase of a

"':PP·
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agreement while preserving the flexibility to withdraw in the fu
ture, the best alternative is to employ express conditions to
gether with no-binding-effect language.us
Two recent decisions, however, suggest that even these pre
cautions may b e insufficient to insulate the parties from contrac
tual liability. In American Cya namid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden

Sales Corp . , 1 1 4 the defendants, Elizabeth Arden Sales Corpora
tion and the executors of the estate of Elizabeth Arden, entered
into a letter agreement with Cyanamid for the sale of the assets
and business of the defendant corporation. The letter recited

division of the defendant's business. The letter was signed on March 22, 1968, with clos
ing to occur on March 30. On March 26, defendant notified the plaintiff that it did not
intend to go forward. The plaintiff sued for breach, arguing that the letter was a binding
sales agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss based upon the letter's last clause:
"It is expressly understood that this is a Letter of Intent and that no lia
bility or obligation of any nature whatsoever is intended to be created between
the parties hereto. This letter is not intended to constitute a binding agree
ment to consummate the transaction outlined herein, nor an agreement to
enter into a final agreement. The parties propose to proceed promptly and in
good faith to prepare a final agreement providing for the transaction contem
plated herein. In the event that such final agreement is not executed, neither
party shall have any obligation to the other for expenses or otherwise."
Id. at 330 (quoting Letter of Intent). In upholding dismissal of the plaintiff's action, the

court stated that, notwithstanding the thorough detail of the letter of intent, it could not
be binding in light of the "plain, clear and unequivocal" language that "the parties did
not intend to be bound." Id. at 331.
Two additional features of this case should be considered. One is the court's recogni
tion that no-binding-effect clauses are countenanced by the Louisiana Civil Code. Ru
benstein, 222 So. 2d at 331; see LA. Crv. CooE ANN. arts. 1813-1815 (West 1986). Second,
although the closing of the transaction was to take place but a short time after the sign
ing of the letter, defendant rescinded the letter only four days after it was signed. Plain
ti ff apparently took no action in reliance upon the letter. Under these circumstances no
countervailing considerations existed to influence the court to view the letter at other
than face value.
11 3. See In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 25 Bankr. 844 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(letter making offer to purchase, though arguably couched in sufficiently definite terms,
was only offer to negotiate where conditioned on board approval, due diligence investiga
tion, and execution of mutually acceptable purchase agreement); cf. Alaska N. Dev., Inc.
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33 ( Alaska 1983) (letter of intent reciting that it
was subject to approval of committee could not be supplemented by oral evidence that
committee's discretion was limited only to review of price; summary judgment for de
fendant in breach of contract action affirmed), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984). As
previously noted, this is the common practice of lenders in loan commitment letters. See
supra discussion at note 17. But cf. Consolidated Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, 297 So.
2d 894 (Miss. 1 974) (action of insurance company in refusing to make loan for unrelated
reasons prevented and excused borrowers from performing necessary conditions; thus
loan commitment was binding contract).
1 14.

3 3 1 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1 971).
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that consummation was "conditioned upon the execution of

a.

mutually satisfactory purchase agreement and, on the part of

�

Cyanamid, the approval of its board of director s . ' 1 1 5 Subse
quently the defendants received and accepted a higher

�ffer

from Eli Lilly and Company. Thereafter the defendants notified
Cyanamid of the sale of the corporation to Lilly. The same day
.
that the notice was received, Cyanamid's board formally ratified
the letter agreement and authorized legal action against the
defendants.
In analyzing the nature of the letter agreement, the court
rejected the defendants' contention that it was a mere "memo
randum of understanding." In the court's view, the document
contained all of the essential subject matter elements necessary
for a contract. 116 The problem was instead "mutuality of obliga
tion." Since Cyanamid could not be bound without its board's
approval, the

letter could obligate neither party until that
time.117 This, however, did not mean that the defendants were
free to revoke what was otherwise a valid offer. Rather, the court
stated that the letter might have constituted an irrevocable offer
under New York law.118 If so, formal acceptance by the board of
Cyanamid would have created a binding contract. The court be
lieved that a full evidentiary hearing was necessary on this issue.
Accordingly, the corporate defendant's motion for summary

Id. at 602 n. 3. Since the letter agreement apparently did not include an ex·
Elizabeth Arden may be classified more precisely under
the rubric of "formal contract contemplated" cases. See supra discussion at note 17.
115.

plicit no-binding-effect clause,

1 16.
11 7.
118 .

331 F. Supp. at 603.

Id. at 605.
Id. at 605 (citing N.Y. GEN. 0BLJG. LAW § 5-1109 (McKinney 1978)). That stat·

ute provides in pertinent part as follows:
[W]hen an offer to enter into a contract is made in a writing signed by the
otferor, or by his agent, which states that the offer is irrevocable during a pe
riod set forth or until a time fixed, the offer shall not be recovable during such
period or until such time because of the absence of consideration for the assur

ance of irrevocability. When such a writing states that the offer is irrevocab
le
but does not state any period or time of irrevocability, it shall be construe to
d
state that the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time.
This statute, adopted in 1941, served as an analogue to § 2-205 of the Uniform Commer


rm o ffers . The purpose of each is to substitute the evidentia
ry function of
�
_
a signed wr1tmg for the tradition
al requirement of separate consideration for an option
.
C(.
REs:r�TE
contract
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 ( 1979) (offer valid as option
.
contract if m wntmg and reciting a " purported" consideration). The existenc
e of the
New York statute m�y n�t have been determ inative. A similar result
could have been
reached based on the 1mphed duty of good faith. See infra notes 126-29
and accompany
ing text.

�

cia Code o

�
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judgment was denied. 1 1 9
The second case, Itek Corp.

v.

Chicago Aerial Industries, 120

moves the letter of intent even further towards the binding end
of the continuum between contract and no-contract. 1 2 1 The prin
cipal stockholders of the defendant, CAI, negotiated an agree
ment whereby Itek was to purchase all of CAi's assets. Thereaf
ter Itek and CAI executed a letter of intent which provided:
"Itek and CAI shall make every reasonable effort to agree
upon and have prepared as quickly as possible a contract pro
viding for the foregoing purchase by Itek and sale by CAI, sub
ject to the approval of CAI stockholders, embodying the above
terms and such other terms and conditions as the parties shall
agree upon. If the parties fail to agree upon and execute such a
contract they shall be under no further obligation to one

another. "122

While subsequent negotiations were taking place, CAi's

principal shareholders renewed discussions with a third party,
Bourns, Inc., concerning the purchase of their stock by Bourns.
Based upon misrepresentatons by these individuals that negotia
tions with Itek were at an impasse, 123 Bourns made a formal of
fer to purchase their stock on February 25, 1965. The stockhold
ers accepted the next day. 124 On March 2, CAI notified Itek that
negotiations were terminated due to "unforeseen circumstances"
and the failure to reach an agreement. 1 211 Thereupon, Itek filed
suit.
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed summary judg
ment in favor of CAI. In response to CAi's reliance upon the no
binding-effect clause, the court stated that all provisions of the
paragraph must be considered together, including the undertak-

1 19.

331 F. Supp. at 606-07. The court dismissed the executors on the grounds that

the attempted revocation was solely the act of the corporate defendant, and that the

executors were merely acting in what they justifiably viewed as the best in te rests of the
estate in pursuing the higher offer by Eli Lilly. Id. at 607.
120.

248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).

121.

See Knapp, supra note 17, at 676.

122.

248 A.2d at 627 (quoting letter of intent).
Earlier on the same day that the stockholders made this statement to Bourns,

123.

they had met with Itek. At that meeting Itek had acceded to additional terms upon
which CAI had insisted. Id. at 628.

124.

Bourns's offer would have resulted in a return of an additional $3.00 per

share.

125.

248 A.2d at 628.
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ing to "make every reasonable effort" to agree upon the terms of
a formal contract. This provision obligated each party to at
tempt in good faith to reach a final and formal agreement. Only
if these "best efforts" proved futile would the parties be ab
solved from further obligations.126 Thus, there was sufficient evi
dence to warrant a finding that both parties intended to be
bound, subject to what was in effect a condition subsequent that
failure to reach a final agreement after good faith negotiation
would discharge them.127 Further, the evidence justified the con
clusion that CAI had breached its duty to proceed in good
faith. 128

Itek, then, strongly suggests another qualification of the

freedom not to contract: one seeking the shelter of a no-binding
effect clause must observe the overriding demands of good faith.
The Itek court rightly refused to allow artificial recitals of inten
tion to supersede this fundamental duty. Expectations emanat
ing from a promise may take many forms, depending upon its
content, while the content may determine in part whether those
expectations are justifiable. In all events, however, parties to
contracts, or contractual negotiations, are entitled to rely upon
the expectation that their counterparts will act according to at
least minimum standards of good faith and fair dealing. Itek
promises that this interest will be protected despite superficial
denials of contractual intent.129

126.

Id. at 629.

127.

The Second Restatement would characterize this as an event that terminates

a duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1979).
128.

248 A.2d at 629. The individual stockholders were dismissed on the grounds

that no contract could arguably exist between them and Itek.
129.

The comments to the Second Restatement recognize this implicit limitation

on the freedom not to contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21, re
porter's note to comment b (1979). For a comprehensive discussion of the question of
unjustifiable withdrawal from negotiations, see Knapp, supra note 17. Restitution of
benefits conferred on the other negotiating party is a further possibility for protecting
the interests of parties to letters of intent. The potential for a quantum meruit claim
seems obvious, although s�ch arguments have not often arisen in American cases, pre 
sumably because of the dt culty of establishing the benefit. See generally Ball, supra
.
note 98, at 575-80 (dtscussmg English cases but concluding that restitutionary recovery

�

will ordin arily be too limited to provide adequate protection to the performing party).
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THE FREEDOM NoT TO CONTRACT AND MonERN CONTRACT

Ill

LAW
This article posits initially that intent is in retreat as an in
dependent element of contractual liability. The foregoing
an alysis clearly supports this conclusion, thereby calling into
question a fun d a m ental tenet of traditional contract law. The
final inquiry of this article asks if other contract theories can
better explain these decisions. Certainly the narrow scope of this
subject provides n o basis upon which to proffer a comprehensive
theory of contractual obligation. In the final determination of
the scope of the freedom not to contract, however, it is u seful to
consider how these decisions may fit within the framework of
contemporary contract thought. Three alternative theories, reli
ance, status, a n d relation, are instructive in this stud y. 1 30

A.

Reliance
Among the most dramatic d evelopments in legal theory in

this century has been the proliferation of reliance-based liabili
ties.131 In contract law, promises rendered enforceable by virtue
of promissory estoppel are the most obvious example. The devel
opment of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is too well-docu
mented to repeat here. 132 In cases in which recovery has been
granted notwithstanding the presence of a no-binding-effect
clause, promissory estoppel has frequently been advanced to ex
plain or justify the result. 133 This has particularly been true of

130.

In a series of recent articles, Professor Melvin Eisenberg has developed a

reconceptualization of contract law that he terms the "responsive model." He argues that
contract principles should be based upon two fundamental considerations: fairness, de
termined by notions of conventional morality, and policy, determined by efficiency and
administrability. Thus, the determination of the principles to govern a specific issue
should be individualized or standardized, and subjective or objective, depending upon an
analysis of that issue in terms of fairness and policy. See Eisenberg, The Responsive
Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv 1 107, 1 1 1 1 ( 1984). Because this work is still in
.

its formative stage, n o attempt has been made to analyze the subject cases i n terms of
this model.

1 31.

See P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 12, at 771. Professor Atiyah would

add to this a belief i n the resurgence of benefit-based liabilities, a development that is
perhaps more common in England than in America. Ultimately, he views the binding
force of promises as flowing from the promise's function as an admission of other obliga
tions between the parties, most of which arise from benefits to the promisor or reliance
by the promisee. See P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, supra note 12, at 193-215.

132.
133.

For a summary of this topic see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 2, at 482-508.
See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 14, § 6- 1 1 , at 2 16; Metzger &

Phillips, supra note 2, at 521-22 & n.333.
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the employer-employee cases. This analysis is too simplistic,
however. To characterize such cases as Tilbert, Schofield, Mab
ley, and Psutka as merely illustrations of the applicatio� of the
principle of Section 90 of the Restatement n ot only m1sst�tes

the nature of the doctrine, but ignores a substantial body of sim
ilar

cases

in

which clear

acts

of reliance

have

not

been

compensated.
In its traditional sense, promissory estoppel has often been
characteriz ed as a substitute for considerat ion. It was the basis
for granting relief to one who had relied upon a promise even
though the promisor had not sought that reliance. 13" In the
death benefit and pension cases, finding consideration is not a

problem. As previously noted, it takes but little judicial imagin a
tion to imply a request that the employee contin u e the faithful
performance of his duties i n "exchange" for the promise of the
future benefit.13& This rationalization, however, presupposes the
existence o f a promise, and that begs the very question at hand.
Presumably the purpose of a no-binding-effect clause is the ne
gation of promise, leaving one with nothing upon which to rely ,

reasonably or unreasonably.136 At the same tim e , these clauses
frequently have been coupled with other expressions that can
only be regarded as inducements to performance. While many
opinions employ the catchword "reliance,'' under traditional
analysis the absence or presence of reliance is significant only
where one begins with a promise. This is the fundamental ele

ment that courts in the foregoing opinions have b ee n forced to
supply, ignore, or honor. Til bert and its kin are not, then ,
"promissory estoppel" cases, although they may b e harbingers of
a broader , more amorphous species of liability based on reliance
alone. 1 37

See Knapp, supra note 10, at 53; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 2 at 482-508.
Nor, for those inclined to symmetry in such matters, have courts h d difficulty
the benefits enjoyed by employers as the result.
ving
percei
in
136. See Grismore, supra note 29 , at 702-03; Metzger & Phillips , supra note 2, at
134.

�

135.

494- 98 .
137.

See G. G1LMORE, supra note 1 2, at 66. To Gilmore, this might illustrate one of
the areas w he re contract has been absorbed by tort, with the result that any reliance on
an assu r an �e m u st be recompense . Id . at 87 �88. Of course, courts have previously ap
plied pro missory estoppel to permit recovery m the absence of an enforceable promise.
See H offman v . Red Owl Stor�s, 26 W i . 2d 683 , 133 N.W.2d
267 ( 1 965 ) ( recovery for
�
.
re l ia nce e x pe n d i tures of potent1 a franchisee allowed notwithstanding promise too indefi
n ite to en fo rc e � s an offer). Outs i de of certain speci fic areas, however, it is arguable that
G i lm ore overest imates the conq uest of contract by tort. See Speidel,
The Bo

�

�

rderla nd of
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A more important determination is why, if reliance was the
basis for recovery in Tilbert, it did not suffice for the plaintiffs
in Spooner a n d other bonus cases. Any attempt to distinguish

these cases by a qualitative analysis of the nature of the reliance
in each is highly questionable. 1 38 Moreover, if the reasonableness
of reliance is the issue, no clear differences between the two lines
emerge. That reliance might be unreasonable due to the nature
of the language employed is equally as true in Tilbert and its
fellows as in Spooner. If anything, it is more likely that an em
ployee would rely upon the assurance of a performance bonus
than a pension or death benefit because the rewards are much
more immediate.
As previously discussed, employees lost many of the bonus
cases due to the lack of a definitely promised reward rather than
because of the purported reservation of employer discretion;139
this is consistent with the traditional requirement in promissory
estoppel cases of a specific promise to be enforced. One comes
full circle, however, to the lack of a true "promise" in cases like
Tilbert. Thus, while elements of promissory estoppel may be im

plicit in certain decisions, it offers no logically consistent expla
nation for the results achieved throughout the broad spectrum
of cases. 1 •0

B.

Status

In a well-known article, Professors Childres and Spitz pos
ited that the manner in which courts interpret and enforce con
tracts often can be explained by the status of the parties. w

Contract, 10 N. Kv. L. REV. 163, 196 (1983). See generally Metzger & Phillips, supra note
2, at 508·36 (discussing development of promissory estoppel as an independent theory of
recovery).
138.
139.
140.

See supra text accompanying note 73.
See supra notes 53, 74-75 and accompanying text.
Besides Spooner, cases in which clear reliance interests of employees went un
compensated include Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1971);
Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927); Hughes v. Encyclo
paedia Britannica, 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 1 1 7 N.E.2d 880 (1954); Kari v. General Motors
Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 261 N.W.2d 222 ( 1977), rev'd per curiam, 402 Mich. 926, 282
N.W.2d 925 ( 1978).
141. Childres & Spitz, supra note 11, at 2. The authors' definition of "status" in
cludes both ascribed and achieved status. Id. at 2-3 n.5. This distinction is significant.
Ascribed status is the status conferred upon a person by such qualities as heredity, age,
or maturation. Achieved status is status obtained by a person's own efforts or initiative.
See Rehbinder, supra note 11, at 954.
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�

They suggested that, within certain defi� ed categor es of cases,
the results should be tested not simply m transact10nal terms,
but according to the status of the parties involved. Taking as
their sample cases involving the parol evidence rule, they con
cluded that an analysis of those cases according to status was
more predictive of results than an attempt to apply a u�itary
parol evidence rule.142 While this methodology can b e apphe to

?

the cases discussed in this article, no consistent conclusions
emerge.
Childres and Spitz suggested that, for analytical purposes,
cases should be divided into three categories. "Formal con
tracts" include those negotiated fairly and comprehensively be
tween parties with some expertise and business s o p histication
and of relatively equal bargaining power. H3 "Informal contracts"
are agreements between parties lacking the sophistication usu
ally evident in the business world. 144 "Contracts involving abuse
of the bargaining process" is a somewhat nebulous catchall cate 
gory involving disparity in bargaining power, lack o f negotiation,
and such obvious examples as adhesion contracts and contracts
objectionable on the basis of unconscionability, public policy,
fraud, duress, and similar grounds.m Most no-binding-effe ct
cases fall within either the first or third categories.
T he true "letter of intent" cases would seem to be examples
of formal contracts. One would expect that among parties of the
same status, courts would be more willing to respect e xpressi ons
of intent than when dealing with parties of unequal bargaining
power. In the ordinary case, sophisticated parties dealing at
a r m ' s length could be expected to abide by the rules they impose
upon them selves. Only in the event of some superseding flaw in
the bargaining process should a court intervene to impose obli 
gations not voluntarily assume d .

Th e lette r of intent cases are i n accord with this analysis .
Du nh ill presents no extrinsic reasons for disregarding the par
ties' expressed intentionS.146 Conversely, Garner, Elizabeth Ar-

1 42.
1 4:l.
144.

Co

. .

Chi ldres & S p itz, supra note 1 1 , at 30.
Id. at 4 .
Id. a t 4 - 5.

145.
Id. at 5.
1 46. The sam e can be said o f l.H. Rubenstein & Son, Inc. v. S perry & Hutch
inson
22:! So. :!d :l29 (La. Ct. App. 1 st Cir.), writ denied, 25 4 L . 757 226
So . 2d 5 21
a
,
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den, and Itek introduce into the equation fairly blatant elements
of bad faith and unfair dealing. 147 There is therefore nothing in
consistent in those courts' willingness to supplement expressions
of intent with duties of another sort.
This neat analysis breaks down, however, when one consid
ers the employment cases. These cases presumably would be
classified as c ontract disputes involving abuse of the bargaining
process. The p ejorative connotations of "abuse" may be mislead
ing. What is meant is that these cases involve, at the very least,
disparity i n bargaining power and lack of mutual negotiation.
One would e xpect that courts would demonstrate sympathy for
employees and seek ways to ameliorate the impact of no-bind
ing-effect clauses. Absent clear indicia that the employee under
stood and accepted the nonbinding nature of the employer's
words, decisions favoring employees would be predictable.
Without repeating what has come before, suffice it to say
that courts have offered only fitful s upport for this conclusion.
With no palpable distinctions in the status of the parties, em
ployees have been far more successful in the pension and death
benefit cases1°'8 than in the bonus cases.149 Each line

of

cases,

however, has been sufficiently inconsistent to suggest that sta
tus-based analysis does not yield predictable results.160

C.

Relatio n a l Contracts

In view of the multitude of scholars whose names are associ
ated with the term, it is difficult to characterize precisely rela
tional theories of contract. un Professor Ian Macneil, perhaps the
preeminent contemporary relationist, uses the term relational
contract theory to distinguish the transactional theory that is
the basis of traditional contract law.1112 He identifies two funda
mental flaws of traditional theory, discreteness and presentia-

(1969), discussed supra note 112.
147. See supra notes 104-29 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 20-59 and accompanying text.
1 49. See supra notes 53-54, 62-78 and accompanying text.
150. Death benefit and pension cases in which employees were unsuccessful are
discussed supra at notes 50, 52, 58-59. Bonus cases in which employees were sucessful
are discussed supra at notes 66, 72, 75.
151. For a list of some adherents, see supra note 12.
152. See, e.g., Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60
VA. L. REV. 589, 592 (1 974).
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g of a tran sact ion from all
tion. Disc rete ness is "the separatin
same time and before and
else betw een the participa nts at the
ging of the futu re into the
after. "1r.3 Pre sentiation is "the brin
el of trad ition al doctrine,
presen t."1M The transact iona l mod
ns. First , it ignores the
then , fails for two fundame ntal reaso
cons ider any facto�s
identity of the parties and, there by, fails to
assen t. lr.r. Second , it
outside of their immediate expre ssions of
e ntire set of
attempts to force within those expressions the
such mat
rights and obligations betwe en the parties , so that all
ance.156 In
ters would be fixed at the time of offer and accept
plan
each instanc e the goal to b e served is the ideal o f perfect
in the
ning for the future. m Since few economic exchan ges occur
el
mod
discrete transactional pattern, however, the transact ional
k a
inevitably proves inadequate .1r.s Relationists accordingly see
n
tha
new structure based upon relational concepts rather
promise.
Relational theory does not, then, purport to offer a more co
gent theoretical basis to explain or rationalize contemporary
case law, but seeks to formulate a model by which transactional
theory can be reformed to rectify its inconsistencies, inade qua
cies, and unfairness. This is to be achieved by r e cogni zing rela
tion as the central generating norm of obligations. u9 A critical
problem faced by relationists is reconciliation of this norm with
the demands of planners and the structural function of intent in
d_e fining relations. Relationists recognize that planning is a legit
imate, if not primary, goal of contract law.160 Defining the role of

I. MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 12, at
Id.

1 5:3.
1 54.
1 55.

60.

Id. at 60-62.

Macneil, supra note 152, at 593.
l . MACNEI L, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 1 2 at
60
M a c n� i l , supra note 152, at 595-96. Thi s ina equa y manifes
1 58.
ts itself in three
. m y w ays. First, most contemp orary
contracts are not the pr od ucts of 1so
p r i ar
· 1ated trans.
.
actwns but rather involve ongoing dealings between the par t•1es. n·1screteness tend s t o
.
· ·
bar a l l such nonprom1ssory factors from consideration in determmmg
t he content of con.
,
tracts. Second, the transactional theory's obsession with ng1· d concepts of offer, accep t.
.
a nce. and performance belies the reality that contracts frequen tiy have no neat1y 1·d ent1.
.
tiable po i nt s of demarcat1on. Finally presentiation atte mpt s to ti x all future dut1e s
·
without regard to unant1c1pated developm ents occurring after the exc h
ange of prom ises.
.
eory
·
must
h
t
use
l
either
trad1twna
hus,
fictions
l
or J udici 8 1 gapfill"mg to respond to unex..
L"
µert.e<l on.' ur re n ces. SI'!' l!(htsey, supra note 7, at 49-56.
I :l9. ('{. Fe i n ma n Critic al Appr oache s tu Contract La w , 30
UCLA L REV 829 857
h"
·
·
'
( c harac termnl( t is quest as a somewhat utopi·an end eavo )
98:1)
l1
r
.
,
,
.
J 60. See I. MACNEii., SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 12 at 47· M
acne1l, supra note 2,
1 56.

157.

d
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intent in the n ew order presumably dictates a synthesis of rela
tional and transactional principles;161 this challenge is likely to
prove the strongest impediment to a workable relational theory.
Because the freedom not to contract in its traditional sense is
perhaps the ultimate expression of deference to intent, the cases
discussed herein pose interesting questions: for example would a
relational analysis suggest different results?162 If so, to the ex
tent that statements of intent are denied primacy, can a rela
tional corollary be articulated which would yield the "right" re
sult in disparate cases? A negative response to this question may
indicate that intent and the promise model, although weakened,
will probably continue to dominate the foreseeable future of
contract law.
In determining the relational response to the freedom not to
contract, the initial inquiry concerns the role of consent in the
relational scheme. In a broad sense, relationists view expressions
of intent as significant primarily to executory contracts of a dis
crete nature. 163 When parties instead deal with one another on
an ongoing basis, it is the relationship thus established that gen
erates its own set of imperatives. These imperatives, in turn,
should principally define the parties' rights and obligations.164
One would thus expect that at a stage where the parties
have as yet had no substantial dealings and their written expres
sions serve only to define initially their respective obligations,
agreed-upon terms should be accorded substantial force. Absent

at 862. Indeed, Macneil has characterized the objective theory of contracts a s "a massive
effort to harmonize transactional contract law with basic social demands for stability of
language. " Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 12, at 812 n.344.
161.

Cf. Macneil, supra note 152, at 605 (discussing the impact of the Second Re

statement in effecting this synthesis).
162.

In view of the lack of theoretical unity among proponents of relational

thought, it should be recognized that any attempt to analyze the subject cases in rela
tional terms is necessarily broad and tentative. Because Professor Macneil h a s developed
what is to date the most coherent statement of relational considerations and objectives,
the following disc·ussion draws heavily (although not exclusively) on his work.
163.

See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, R1sE AND FALL, supra note 12, at 758; I. MACNEIL, SOCIAL

CONTRACT, supra note 12, at 49-50 (discussing the "triggering role" of intent in contract
obligati ons).
164.

See P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, supra note 12, at 193; C. FRIED, supra note 9, at 76;

L. FULLER, supra note 12, at 44 (speaking of "customary" law); Macneil, Many Futures,

supra note 12, at 715-16. Of course, there is no unanimity among relationists regarding
why relations generate duties, the nature of the obligations thus created, or the exact

interacti on between relation and promise.
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a relationship (in anything beyond the b roadest societal sense of
the term) which generates mutual imperatives, the partie s ' ex
pressed intent provides the clearest focus to determine their
rights and duties. As the relationship progresses beyond its
formative stage, the i nitial written expression may yield to the
internal pressures of the parties' mutual dealings. From this per
spective, the letter of intent cases appear entirely consistent.
Dunhill, which involves only preliminary dealings and i n dustry
wide usages, makes intent preeminent. 16lj Garner, on the other
hand, demonstrates that expressed intent must yield to p e rfor m 
ance, while Eliza beth Arden and It ek supplement written ex
pressions of intent with imperatives growing out of duties cen
tral to the developing relationship, the j ustifiable expectation o f
good faith and fair dealing. In so doing, those courts reach re
sults consonant with prevailing notions of commercial morality.
Again, however, the employment cases present a less logical
progression.

Relationists

have

identified

employer-employee

agreements as among the most obvious examples of contracts
peculiarly subject to relational considerations.166 Both death
bene fit187 and bonus cases168 have been cited to illustrate rela
tion-based duties. Surely this is true i n many instances, but the
inconsistencies observed in the earlier discussion of these cases
conversely illustrate both the strong influence of intent upon our
contract system and the difficulties inherent in articulating rela
tion al guidelines that amount to anything more than the ad hoc
judicial gapfilling so often criticized by relationists.

This problem is apparent in Professor Macneil's discussion
of Tilbert and Spooner. He characterizes both as attempts to

Hifi. The lack of relational imperatives to supplemen t expressions of intent also
may have ht'e n dett'rminat ive in l.H. Rubenstein & Son, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., '..! :l :l So. :ld :l:l9 ( La. Ct. App. lst Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 757, 226 So. 2d 521

( 1969). discussed •upra note l l 2.
lf}li. S1•1•. t'.I( . . L. F.ULLER •upra note 12, at 8 1 ; M a cn e i l , supra note 152,
at 595. Of
cour�t' . rven co u rts nominall y committed to
tradition al doct nne
·
h ave Iong tend ed to analyze employer-employee contracts in ways that depart fro m th e pnst .
me promise mod e 1.
.
,-;,.,. P ATIYAH. R1sF. AND FALL. .�upra note 1 2 at 764·, C h 1' ld res & Sp1· tz,
supra note 1 1 , at
'2.
tti7. -.;,.,. 1M a('nei· 1 -'Upra note 15'.l, at 600-0 1 ; see a lso .� upra
notes 1 8-60 and accom p1m\· 111ic 1 1• x 1 .
l fiH. ,-.;,.,. I . F111 1 F. R supra note l :l , at 8 1 ( d 1scussm
'
g bonus cases as "instances
whnr nrt111nR IM'tter, mterac tinnR-Rpeak louder than words"
) · .-ee
. a Iso supra
.
notes 6 27!1 and 11rrompanyin l( tt'xt.
.

•
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shoehorn essentially relational issues into an "unaccommodating
format" based on traditional principles of presentiation189-a
classic problem of square pegs and round holes. He asserts that
in neither case is a black letter rule based on mutual assent and
presentiation a satisfactory basis for decision. 170 He argues that
the manifestations of intent are clearly at odds with the purpose
of the employers' promises. He concludes that " [o] nly examina
tion of the relational setting in which the proposals were made
reveals principles for determining whether reliance was justified,
reliance not primarily on the manifestations of quasi-nonassent
but primarily on the relations of which those manifestations
were only a small part. "171
This analysis is true; unfortunately it does not go far
enough, not because it fails to demonstrate that Tilbert was de
cided correctly but because it fails to provide a sufficient ration
ale for concluding that the Spooner court was wrong. Consider
ing the circumstances of each case, in neither were the parties in
an executory posture; relationships of some standing were in
volved. Strong expectations would be generated by those rela
tionships, particularly when an employer who offered with one
hand sought to withdraw with the other. In Tilbert only a uni
lateral expression of intent existed to counterbalance these rela
tional considerations; thus, few would quarrel with its result. In

Spooner, however, one cannot dispense with intent so facilely.
As previously noted, the Spooner plaintiffs manifested their "as
sent" to the employer's offer by the classic objective means of
signing it.172 While objective assent has never been equated with
subjective understanding, the employees may have been aware
of the ephemeral nature of the proposal. If that were true, then
two challenges confront the relationists. The first is the possibil
ity that the decision may be justifiable on this basis.173 If not,
the second challenge is greater still: coherent guidelines must be
formulated for determining when assent must yield to relations.

169.

Macneil, supra note 152, at 600.

170.

Id. at 601. Macneil speaks of Tilbert and Spooner in their context

as

illustra-

tions to sections 21 (formerly 218) and 45, respectively, of the Second Restatement.

17 1.
172.
173.

Id. at 602.

See supra text accompanying note 7 1 .
Even if this were true, the holding was not necessarily correct. Such a ration 

ale may be unduly penal. However, if, as Professor Gilmore has argued, tort has ab
sorbed contract, perhaps those employees might be said to have assumed the risk of their
employer's capriciousness.
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The articulation of relational objectives and the design of a
concomitant structure for decision remain the ultimate impedi
ment for relationists, as indeed to proponents of all alternative
contract theories. Both the planning demands of future bargain
ers and the practical predilections of judges schooled in tradi
tional theory compel the formulation of "rules. " Albeit flexible,
imbued with a healthy measure of judicial discretion, and sub
ject to the constantly shifting and expanding dictates o f good
faith, a decisionmaking construct is nonetheless mandated. 1 74
The inconsistencies of the employment cases and the problem of
formulating workable alternative bases for decision demonstrate
the problems inherent in practical implementation of alternative
models of contract.1111 For the immediate future, and perhaps
much longer, the underpinnings of the traditional regime of in
tent are likely to continue as the fundamental framework of our
law of contract, although the continued evolution o f contract
theory

will
factors.176

incorporate increasing

recognition

of

relational

CONCLUSION

IV.

This article began by questioning the viability of the free
dom not to contract incorporated in section 2 1 of the Restate

ment (Second) of Contracts.177

An examination of defined cate

gories of cases that invoke the right to exercise this freedom has
shown that the Restatement formulation is too broad to serve as
a predictor of judicial response. To the extent that the freedom
not to contract is recognized, it allows bargainers to allocate
risks between themselves by opting for a regime of nonenforce
ment. 1 78 Commercial parties accordingly may exercise this free-

174.

1322;

cf. I.

See Feinman, supra note 159, at 844, 860; Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at
MACNEIL,

SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra

note 12, at 86 (recognizing need for discrete

legal principles in contract law, but emphasizing that such principles can never be
absolute).
1 7 5. Professor Macneil acknowledges this difficulty. See Macneil, supra note 152,
at 605; cf. Feinman, supra note 159, at 860 (no alternative theory has been offered that
leads inevitiably to the correct decision in each case).
1 76. See Speidel, supra note 137, at 196-98 (predicting that courts dealing with
complex contract transactions will develop a creative synthesis of contract and tort prin
ciples under the general duty of good faith); cf. Blum & Wellman, supra note 9, at 93738 (arguing that mutual assent, as a constitutio nally protected liberty, remains the fun
damental standard of contract law).
177. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
178.

See Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at 1295 & n.73.
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dom with a modicum of safety, but only insofar as their actions
are consistent with their expressed intent and the accepted prac
tices in their industry. Employers can take little comfort in this
freedom, absent some extrinsic defect in their promises that oth
erwise prevents those statements from constituting "offers," a
clear indication of their employees' knowledge of the nonbinding
nature of those statements, or the existence of other circum
stances that would make reliance unreasonable. Apart from a
possible in terrorem effect, disclaimers by employers are often
only meaningless posturings. The Second Restatement's broad
formulation of the freedom not to contract is, thus, an outmoded
vestige of an era when a written statement of intent reigned su
preme without regard to its relation to the actual understanding
of the parties. 179 A realistic statement of this freedom must in
corporate the qualifications and limitations of reliance, fair deal
ing, and good faith. The Second Restatement should be under
stood as in need of reform in this area. 180
In light of this evidence of the waning influence of assent,
this article has analyzed the implications of several representa
tive cases on the present and future development of contract
theory. Perhaps paradoxically, this analysis has demonstrated
the enduring predominance of the promise model in judicial rea
soning. No satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies ob
served in these cases emerges when alternative theories are ana
lyzed.

Critical

examination

dramatically

exposes

the

gaps

existing between the abstract statements of those theories and

179. Of course, expressions in contracts that are inconsistent with the reasonable
beliefs and expectations of one of the parties are often a hallmark of unconscionability.
Courts frequently use that doctrine to address unreasonable provisions. See, e.g. , Fort,
Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 765, 785-94
(1978).
180. At a minimum, the black-letter rule of the Second Restatement should be
reworded to state a principle of general application only in commercial transactions. It

must be noted that many English authorities seem to accept the freedom not to contract
on a fairly uncritical basis. See W. ANSON, supra note 5, at 66-69; CHESHIRE & FtFOOT's
LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 5, at 102-04. But cf. Hepple, supra note 101 (arguing that
courts should abandon separate requirement of intention and rest enforceability solely
on presence vel non of bargain). It should be noted that the English cases most fre
quently cited in support of this proposition were decided during the first half of this
century. See, e.g. , Rose & Frank Co. v. J.R. Crampton & Bros., Ltd., ( 1 925] A.C. 445,
alf'g, [ 1923) 2 K.B. 251; Appleson v. Littlewood, Ltd., (1939) 1 All E.R. 464; Jones v.
Vernon's Pools, Ltd., ( 1938] 2 All E.R. 626. Similarly, English courts have not yet em
braced the doctrine of promissory estoppel as enthusiastically as their American counter
parts. See P. ATIVAH, R1sE AND FALL, supra note 12, at 775-78.
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their practical applications by courts. Ultimately cases dealing
with this freedom suggest that intent, in a form however modi
fied or circumscribed, will continue for some time as the ground
of our law of contract.

